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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1 Abstract 
 
This paper will attempt to create a theoretical model integrating horizontal and vertical 
product differentiation as well as optimal price setting. 
 
 
Horizontal differentiation will occur in two different ways: First — analogously to the 
standard HOTELLING
1
 model — by choosing a location along a spectrum of individual 
customer preferences (product or characteristic space
2
), and second, by choosing a length of 
horizontal expansion extending symmetrically from the chosen location in its centre, 
allowing the producer to design a product simultaneously and equally covering more than one 
individual preference at a time. 
 
 
Vertical differentiation will occur by choosing a level of produced quality equally perceived 
by all potential customers, regardless of the horizontal location of their individually preferred 
characteristic. Only one single level of quality is chosen, resulting in quasi-fixed cost 
independent of the number of units produced. 
 
 
Optimal price setting will occur by determining one single optimal price valid for every 
customer regardless of their horizontal location of their preferred characteristic (mill pricing).  
                                                
1
 HOTELLING (1929), pp. 41-57 
2
 CARLTON & PERLOFF (2005), p. 206 
 8 
I.e., a firm may not differentiate prices, setting different prices for different market segments/ 
consumers. 
 
 
First, a monopolist’s optimal choice of the strategic variables location, horizontal expansion, 
quality, and price will be determined, assuming that there is no threat of entry. 
Second, we will examine an incumbent’s possible entry deterrence strategies in oligopolistic 
competition with free entry.
3
 On the part of the entrant, three different strategies of entry will 
be discussed: Central entry and competition, Central entry and peripheral competition, and 
Peripheral entry and competition. These must in turn be anticipated by the incumbent, whose 
respective deterrence strategies will be compared with regard to their preemptive effect. 
 
1.2 Limitation 
Please note that in this context, no incumbent strategies other than deterrence, like 
accommodation (letting the entrant profitably take location, thus sharing the market), will be 
discussed. 
 
                                                
3
 At this point, oligopolistic competition with free entry must be distinguished from monopolistic competition. 
Both face downward-sloping demand curves and the total annihilation of profit, but in monopolistic 
competition, a price change by one firm has only negligible effect on the demand of any other firm (e.g. 
TIROLE (1994), p. 247). As we will see in this model as well, this is not so in oligopolistic competition. 
For a discussion of monopolistic competition, see Edward Hastings CHAMBERLIN (1933), e.g. in CHAMBERLIN 
(1965): “The Theory of Monopolistic Competition: A Re-orientation of the Theory of Value”, Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press, 8th ed., or, for an overview, e.g. CARLTON & PERLOFF (2005), ch. 7 (pp. 200ff). 
For a discussion on the extent of entry, see SALOP (1979) (also reviewed in TIROLE (1994), ch. 7.1.2 
(pp. 282ff), as well as in CARLTON & PERLOFF (2005), pp. 223ff) 
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2. MODEL ELEMENTS 
 
 
 
First we will introduce the model’s strategic variables (in chapter 2.1), second, the exogenous 
parameters (chapter 2.2). Subsequently follow compound terms that will be of great interest 
(2.3), and, on the basis of all of those, the construction of the model itself (in 2.4). 
 
 
 
2.1 Strategic variables 
 
 
As stated, the model developed throughout chapter 2 will incorporate as strategic variables the 
monopolist’s or incumbent’s horizontal location, horizontal expansion, (vertical) quality, and 
price. 
 
The incumbent must set all four strategic variables before the potential entrant sets his 
(sequential game; this will be of importance in chapter 4 Behaviour under Threat of Entry, 
and i.e. in 4.2 Strategies of Entry and Entry Deterrence). In this, the model at hand differs 
from the classical models of HOTELLING 1929 and SALOP 1979, where location is either 
exogenously given or where all players simultaneously take up location first before any one 
sets his price in a second phase. 
 
A firm’s choice of strategic variables is a binding commitment, and may therefore not be 
altered later in the game. 
 
All strategic variables are non-negative by nature. 
 10 
2.1.1 Location 
As in the standard models (HOTELLING 1929, SALOP 1979), a “location” is chosen among 
possible values of a one-dimensional characteristic of finite length (product or characteristic 
space
4
). “Location” can e.g. be interpreted as  
• Geographic location: one geographic location (e.g. of an outlet, or a service-
providing device like a broadcasting tower or mobile telecommunications mast) 
amidst the (actual or preferred) locations of customers along one dimension (e.g. a 
street), 
• Variant: one variant of a product among other variants that are favoured by other 
customers (equally many, given uniform distribution of customer preferences along 
the dimension of “location”), 
• Design: a design among other possible designs of equal quality, 
• Sensory characteristic: An example for a limited but continuous scale where it is 
plausible that individual preferences are equally distributed is the colour spectrum of 
visible light. A main colour may be chosen from the spectrum — or any other 
sensory characteristic that may be viewed being a choice from a more or less 
continuous spectrum of perceivable (and potentially enjoyable) possibilities (like e.g. 
beats per minute). 
• Complexity: a versatile but complex technology or user interface versus an easy-to-
use interface with limited but sufficient functionality. Early adopters
5
 like high-end 
technology users and beta testers usually prefer the first, while laggards or the late 
majority may prefer the latter. Or, connoisseurs of visual arts, music or avantgarde 
cuisine may prefer more complex oeuvres or artful concepts, compositions or 
arrangements, or more experimental tastes, while others may prefer “products” that 
are easier to follow or to enjoy. 
                                                
4
 CARLTON & PERLOFF (2005), p. 206 
5
 terminology employed by Everett M. ROGERS in: ROGERS , Everett M., (1962), “Diffusion of Innovations”, 
Free Press of Glencoe, Macmillan Company 
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Location is therefore a horizontal criterion, as it reflects individual preference of one variant 
to others, rather than an objective/intersubjective characteristic where every customer would, 
cet. par., prefer one value to another. 
 
In the model at hand, every location is available at the same cost (zero). 
 
Every player must choose one single location (no brand proliferation by a single player). And 
as stated above, every player has to choose his location simultaneously with his other strategic 
variables. Location choice is sequential only in the sense that the incumbent chooses his 
location (as well as all his other strategic variables) before the entrant sets his location (and 
the rest of his strategic variables). As stated above, in this the game differs from the standard 
models of HOTELLING 1929 and SALOP 1979, where all players take up location first before 
any one sets his price in a second phase. Sequential location choice in a linear product space 
has been discussed by PRESCOTT & VISSCHER (1977)
6
, SCHMALENSEE (1978)
7
, JUDD (1982), 
and Lambertini (2002)
8
. 
2.1.2 Horizontal expansion  ? 
Whereas earlier models (as HOTELLING 1929 or SALOP 1979
9
) only allowed for pinpoint 
locations, in the model at hand the producer may choose to offer a length of horizontal 
“expansion” extending symmetrically from the chosen location in its centre, allowing the 
producer to design a product simultaneously covering more than one individual preference at 
a time. Thus, consumers located within horizontal expansion  ?  do not incur transportation 
costs. 
 
                                                
6
 Edward C. PRESCOTT & Michael VISSCHER (1977): “Sequential location among firms with foresight”, The Bell 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Autumn 1977), pp. 378-393. The full text is publicly accessible at the 
RAND Corporation website  http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/3003293  
7
 Richard SCHMALENSEE (1978): “Entry Deterrence in the Ready-to-Eat Breakfast Cereal Industry”, The Bell 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Autumn 1978), pp. 305-327 
8
 Luca LAMBERTINI (2002): “Equilibrium locations in a spatial model with sequential entry in real time”, 
Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, Vol. 32, No. 1 (January), pp. 47-58 
9
 a discussion of Salop’s model can e.g. be found in TIROLE (1994), ch. 7.1.2 (pp. 282ff), as well as in 
CARLTON & PERLOFF (2005), pp. 223ff 
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The model at hand assumes progressively (quadratically) increasing horizontal expansion 
costs: 
K?(?)  =  k? · ?? [2.1] 
Interpretations of horizontal expansion may include: 
• Opening hours: Costs increase progressively with the offered time interval as wages 
per hour rise, e.g. when standard working time elapses and supplemental hours 
begin. One problem with this interpretation may be the assumption of uniformly 
distributed consumers’ preferred time for shopping. Another simplification differing 
from reality that this interpretation requires would be a shopping time duration of 
zero, as the individual choice from the offered expansion is one preferred value only, 
rather than an interval. 
• Geographic distribution range: If location designates the (sole) region in which the 
producer decides to settle, geographic distribution range may designate the range 
within which a dense distribution network is established. Progressive costs may arise 
e.g. from ever-more-costly logistics. 
• Performance range: Progressively costly technology allowing for flawless 
performance within the chosen range (e.g. telecommunications broadcasting). 
Beyond performance range, broadcasting quality or bandwidth begins to decrease 
until no bandwidth is left (see (linear) transportation costs). 
• Customization of the chosen basic variant (corresponding to the chosen “location”): 
Customizing elements may become progressively more expensive as the customized 
variants deviate more and more from the basic product. This model assumes a one-
dimensional continuum of variants (e.g. quantum supercomputer—
mainframe system—large or business network—small or private network—tabletop 
workstation—notebook—mini note-book – palmtop, or convertible—sportscar—
coupé—limousine—van—SUV—real offroader, assuming every feature or technical 
part could be customized to suit either the former or the next variant, thus creating a 
quasi continuum of possible in-between-variants); it would have to be modified in 
order to suit products that are horizontally differentiated in multiple dimensions. 
 13 
• Feature sets: The basic product (“location”) may come along in more or less 
variants including more (e.g. for the high-end users) or less (e.g. for those preferring 
an easy-to-use interface) features or applications. 
• Sensory sets, e.g. colour sets: The more colours or other sensory characteristics that 
individual consumers might value have to be integrated into one single product 
without thwarting individual “aesthetic utility”, the more elaborated the design will 
have to be. 
Horizontal expansion thus constitutes a variable that serves a length of adjoining locations of 
consumer preferences. 
2.1.3 Quality  q 
By way of quality, vertical product differentiation is integrated in the model. Quality is 
identical to utility gained from the product, and is equally perceived and valued by all 
consumers, regardless of the location of their individually preferred variant. 
uq(q)  ?  q [2.2] 
As the respective cost function employs a cost factor kq , no additional factor translating 
quality into utility is needed.
10
 Therefore, the willingness to pay for quality is linear as well. 
 
An example for less intuitive interpretations of quality may be that of 
                                                
10
 This can be shown as follows: 
Assume a factor translating quality into utility, consumer sensitivity to quality sq : 
uq(q) = sq · q 
Then the quadratic cost function to produce this level of consumer utility would be: 
Kq(u) = ?q · uq2 = ?q · sq2 · q2 
But as both ?q and sq2 are constant, we can aggregate those two factors to a single factor,  kq := ?q · sq2, yielding: 
Kq(q) = kq · q
2 
Therefore, only one factor (kq) is needed to relate produced consumer utility to cost. 
 14 
• Transmission power: Beyond the short broadcasting range (within which 
broadcasting quality does not vary / decrease), transmission power may determine 
total broadcasting range. With linear “transportation costs”, broadcasting quality 
would linearly decrease with increasing distance from the flawless broadcasting 
range. 
The model at hand assumes progressively (quadratically) increasing quality production costs 
(see 2.3.4). 
 
Only one quality level of quality may be chosen and offered to all customers. 
 
Quality directly benefits net consumer surplus (see 2.4.4). 
2.1.4 Price  p 
In the model at hand, every firm must set one single price for all potential customers (a firm 
may not differentiate price for different market segments/customers). As stated above, price 
setting has to be effected simultaneously with the choice of the firm’s other strategic variables 
location, horizontal expansion, and quality. 
 
Analogously to quality, consumer disutility equals price; no additional disutility function is 
employed. Thus, disutility from price is linear, and normalised to match the units of price 
(factor equal to 1): 
up(p)  =  – p [2.3] 
Price also equals gross revenue per purchasing consumer — every customer buys one unit 
of the product if his net surplus is non-negative (see transportation costs). Gross revenue per 
purchasing consumer is decreased by marginal cost (per unit produced) to equal gross margin 
(see marginal cost). 
 
Price directly affects net consumer surplus (see 2.4.4).  
 15 
 
 
 
2.2 Exogenous parameters 
 
 
 
Contrary to the above strategic variables, the following parameters are not subject to the 
monopolist’s choice and consequently cannot be optimized, but are exogenous, constant and, 
in oligopolistic competition with free entry (chapter 4), equal for all players. 
 
All parameter values are non-negative. 
2.2.1 Number of consumers  N 
N designates the total number of consumers present along the spectrum of preferences L (see 
below), and equally, as every consumer purchases either one or zero products, the maximum 
number of sales (sold units) possible. 
2.2.2 Length of characteristic space  L 
N consumers are, in this model, uniformly distributed over characteristic space, that is, the 
length of the spectrum of preferred variants, L. 
 
A parameter derived from the number of consumers N and length L, which is, as we will see, 
of interest for the optimization calculation, is consumer density N/L (see 2.3.1). 
 16 
2.2.3 Transportation cost factor  ? 
? is the factor by which the distance between the location of an offered product and the 
locations of consumers’ preferred variants is decreasing their utility, and thus probably the 
most influential parameter in this model. In other terms, ? is the factor by which distance 
discounts utility, thus resulting in the net surplus of a consumer whose preferred variant is 
located at a certain distance from an offered variant. 
 
Correspondingly, 1/?  is the factor by which a certain level of consumer surplus can be 
translated into a range of attraction to any side, within which consumers will still benefit 
from a non-negative net surplus despite the remoteness of their preferred variant from the 
location where said maximum consumer surplus is being offered (see also section 2.4.6 Range 
of attraction rj ). 
2.2.4 Marginal costs  c 
Marginal costs designate the costs of production for one unit of the product that is 
subsequently sold to a customer demanding it. 
 
In the model at hand, marginal costs are constantly equal to c — rather than decreasing with 
the number of units produced, which would reflect classical economies of scale. Nevertheless, 
the model does show economies of scale, as unit production costs are independent of quality, 
which in turn causes quantity-independent costs, which again can be “spread” on more 
(economies of scale) or less units to cover quality production costs. Thus, given a certain 
quality level, quantity does reduce unit price, in the end. 
 17 
2.2.5 Quality cost factor  kq 
The factor by which squared quality q? causes costs (see 2.3.4 Quality production costs). 
2.2.6 Horizontal expansion cost factor  k? 
The factor by which squared horizontal expansion ?? causes costs  (see 2.3.5 Horizontal 
expansion costs). 
2.2.7 Fixed and entry costs 
In the calculation, fixed costs are omitted due to their trivial subtractive nature. 
 
We do not assume entry costs, which would entail further discussion in terms of entry and 
entry deterrence. The known effects include that if entry costs are sunk costs, the incumbent, 
having already entered the market, does not incur entry costs, whereas the entrant would need 
to bear entry costs. For this reason, the incumbent would not need to relinquish the totality of 
his profits, but may, in a one-phase game, keep a profit up to the entrant’s entry costs, and still 
deter him. See e.g. TIROLE 1994 (chapter 8) for a detailed discussion of these issues. 
 
 18 
 
2.3 Crucial compound terms 
 
 
 
The following compound terms are neither strategic variables, nor do they constitute 
additional exogenous parameters, but are derived from one or, usually, more-than-one of the 
former. 
 
All values are non-negative. 
2.3.1 Consumer density  N/L 
Consumer density N/L, the quotient of the number of consumers N over characteristic space L, 
is another (obviously non-independent) parameter which, as we will see, is of interest for 
profit calculation and, therefore, optimization. 
2.3.2 Maximum consumer surplus  u?(p, q) 
Maximum consumer surplus designates the largest possible utility that can be generated by a 
consumer located within horizontal expansion  ?  (therefore incurring no transportation cost) 
by purchasing at price p one unit of a product of quality q. Maximum consumer surplus is 
equal to the difference between quality q and price p:  
u?(p, q)  =  q  –  p [2.4] 
Maximum consumer surplus will be a crucial item in oligopolistic competition with free entry 
(chapter 4). 
 
 19 
Please note that we will repeatedly use the abbreviated form “consumer surplus” whenever it 
clearly follows from context that this means “maximum consumer surplus” (whereas we will 
never omit the “net” in “net consumer surplus”, see section 2.4.4). 
2.3.3 Gross margin  (p – c) 
Gross margin, (p – c), or the difference of collected price minus marginal cost, is another 
element of the profit function, and therefore regularly shows in the optimization calculation. 
2.3.4 Quality production costs  Kq(q) 
As stated in section 2.2.4 Marginal costs, a chosen quality level does not impact on unit 
production costs, but causes (part of total) overhead costs amounting to: 
Kq(q)  =  kq · q? [2.5] 
Thus, quality production costs, the exogenous quality production costs factor kq aside (see 2.2 
Exogenous parameters, section 2.2.5), solely depend on the squared level of quality q?. 
 20 
2.3.5 Horizontal expansion costs  K?(?) 
The (part of total) overhead costs of offering a positive horizontal expansion (see 2.1 Strategic 
variables, section 2.1.2) are proportional to the expansion cost factor  k?  (see 2.2 Exogenous 
parameters, section 2.2.6) and increase quadratically with horizontal expansion  ? : 
K?(?)  =  k? · ?? [2.6] 
2.3.6 Profit  ? 
The producers’ profits are their central interest, and thus the term to be maximized, 
respectively, be it the monopolist’s profit, incumbent’s, or the potential entrant’s.  
 
Ignoring all constraints as well as the problems in optimizing location and arising by 
competition, profit primarily depends on the choice of the strategic variables horizontal 
expansion  ?, price  p, and quality  q, and, making use of the elements defined in the above 
sections 2.3.1 through 2.3.5, can be expressed as shown in Table 2.1: 
 
 
Table 2.1: The profit function ? (?, p, q) and its elements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? (?, p, q)   =   (N / L) · [ ? + 2 · (q ? p) /? ] · (p ? c)  ? k? · ?2  ? kq · q2 
consumer 
density 
purchasing part of 
characteristic space 
gross 
margin 
(quadratic) 
horizontal 
expansion 
costs 
(quadratic) 
quality 
production 
costs 
contribution to overhead 
costs and profit 
overhead costs 
number of purchasing 
consumers  =  total demand 
hori-
zontal 
expan-
sion 
attraction range 
of max. surplus 
(on either side 
of  ?) 
? 
? 
+ + 
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The following graphics (Graphics 2.I) illustrate the interaction of the elements of the profit 
function as defined in Table 2.1: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graphics 2.I: Interaction of the elements of the profit function ? (?, p, q) 
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2.4 Consumer behaviour 
 
 
 
In general, consumers are assumed to strive for maximization of their individual utility (see 
sections 2.4.2 to 2.4.4), i.e. with respect to their individual location. Consumers are assumed 
to rationally decide whether or not to purchase in case of one single offer, and, in addition, 
which offer to purchase in case that more than one offer is capable of increasing individual 
utility. 
 
Chapter 2.4 will succinctly discuss consumer endowment (section 2.4.1), consumer utility 
from quality (2.4.2), consumer disutility from price and transportation costs (2.4.3), net 
consumer surplus (2.4.4), individual demand (2.4.5), and, following from that, a producer’s 
range of attraction (2.4.6) and total demand (2.4.7). 
 23 
2.4.1 Consumer endowment 
We assume that every consumer’s income or endowment allows him to potentially purchase 
one unit of the product at equilibrium price. 
2.4.2 Elements of consumer utility 
Consumer utility is, for every consumer, identical to quality: 
uqi(q)  ?  q [2.7] 
As was shown in 2.1.3, in view of the progressive costs of producing consumer utility, 
additional factors (e.g. sensitivity to quality) translating quality into utility are obsolete.
11
 
 
From a given quality, all consumers obtain the same level of utility (i.e., there is no 
distribution of sensitivity to quality as e.g. in GABSZEWICZ & THISSE (1979) or SHAKED & 
SUTTON (1982). 
2.4.3 Elements of consumer disutility 
As with quality, consumer disutility from price is assumed to be identical for every consumer 
and equal to  p: 
upi(p)  =  –  p [2.8] 
 24 
Disutility from individual transportation costs is assumed to be linear and equal to 
transportation costs as well: 
u?i(zi*)  =  – ? · | zi ? zi*| [2.9] 
where  ?  is the transportation costs factor (see section 2.2.3), zi consumer i’s location in 
horizontal characteristic space L, and zi* the nearest location offered by a producer
12
. 
Consequently, if zi lies within a producer’s horizontal expansion , then the consumer does not 
incur any transportation costs with this producer at all. 
2.4.4 Net consumer surplus  ui 
Following from [2.7] through [2.9], consumer i’s net surplus resulting from the overall 
transaction in question equals 
ui(p, q, zi*)  =  q  –  p  –  ? · | zi ? zi*| [2.10] 
2.4.5 Individual demand 
Same as the standard location models (HOTELLING 1929, SALOP 1979) this model assumes 
unit demand, i.e., every consumer i can and will purchase either zero or one unit (at the most). 
                                                                                                                                                   
11
 This can be shown as follows: 
Assume a factor translating quality into utility, consumer sensitivity to quality sq : 
uq(q) = sq · q 
Then the quadratic cost function to produce this level of consumer utility would be: 
Kq(u) = ?q · uq2 = ?q · sq2 · q2 
But as both ?q and sq2 are constant, we can aggregate those two factors to a single factor,  kq := ?q · sq2, yielding: 
Kq(q) = kq · q
2 
Therefore, only one factor (kq) is needed to relate produced consumer utility to cost. 
12
 zi* therefore is the outcome of consumer i’s optimization (maximization of utility) with regard to one 
particular producer’s offered locations. 
 25 
Maximizing individual utility ui , one unit will be purchased from the one producer j whose 
terms (?j, pj, qj) allow for the maximum positive net surplus uij . This can be at the nearest 
location, just as well as at a location further away, if quality and price over-compensate for 
distance (transportation costs). 
As there is no outside good
13
, a consumer will not purchase if his net surplus is negative with 
every producer’s offer. 
2.4.6 Range of attraction rj 
Consequently, and following from maximum consumer surplus (see the above sections) and 
transportation costs
14
, every consumer i located within producer j’s total range of 
attraction  rj 
rj(?j, pj, qj)  =  ?j  +  2 · (qj ? pj) / ? [2.11] 
will (be able and will actually) buy one unit, given that no competitor offers a higher net 
surplus. 
                                                
13
 as in SALOP 1979 
14
 see section 2.2.3 Transportation cost factor ?, as well as Table 2.1 The profit function ? (?, p, q) and its 
elements 
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2.4.7 Total demand Dj 
Boundaries and, again, competition aside, producer j’s total demand Dj is equal to (one unit 
times) consumer density N/L, times the purchasing characteristic space, consisting of 
horizontal expansion ?j , plus those locations where consumers still buy because their utility 
exceeds price and transportation costs:
15
 
Dj(?j, pj, qj)  =  (N / L) · [ ?j  +  2 · (qj ? pj) / ? ] [2.12] 
 
                                                
15
 see also Table 2.1 The profit function ? (?, p, q) and its elements 
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2.5 Logical model constraints 
 
 
 
The following sections discuss those logical constraints that define the model’s solution space 
defining the valid values for its strategic variables, i.e. horizontal expansion ?, quality q, and 
price p (see chapter 2.1 Strategic variables). 
Analytical border and corner solutions (marginal solutions) will unfold along those same 
constraints. 
 
For parameter constraints, i.e. non-negativity of parameters, see chapter 2.2. 
2.5.1 Constraint 1:  Non-negative maximum consumer surplus 
In consequence of terms [2.7], [2.8], and [2.10] in sections 2.4.2 through 2.4.4, respectively, 
price p may never exceed quality q, in order to not let consumer surplus (within the 
boundaries of horizontal expansion ?) fall below zero, which would result in no consumers 
purchasing at all, be they in- or outside ?. 
C1:   q  –  p  ?  0    ?    p  ?  q [2.13] 
Converging towards C1 implies a maximum pricing strategy, leaving no consumer surplus 
at all. Therefore, no consumer located outside the monopolist’s horizontal expansion ? has an 
incentive to purchase, as transportation costs causes their surplus to drop below zero. 
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2.5.2 Constraint 2:  Non-negative horizontal expansion 
As all strategic variables, horizontal expansion ? (see section 2.1.2) cannot be negative: 
C2:   ?  ?  0 [2.14] 
2.5.3 Constraint 3:  No excess horizontal expansion / excess range of attraction 
Maximum horizontal expansion can be argued in terms of 
C3a:   ?  ?  L [2.15] 
in order for horizontal expansion ? (see section 2.1.2) to not exceed characteristic space 
length L (see section 2.2.2), or as 
C3b:   ?   ?   L  –  2 / ? · (q – p) [2.16] 
in order for range of attraction r (see section 2.4.6, i.e. term [2.11]) to not exceed L. 
Clearly, C3b includes C3a, which is why they are subsumed in the section at hand. The 
solution space resulting from C3a (and C1 and C2 and C4) will include the one resulting from 
C3b, being identical only at C1 where q equals p and the difference term  – 2 /   · (q – p) 
therefore equals 0. 
 
Constraints are not necessary logically, as any y* optimized in terms of profit will not exceed 
L, but, analytically, they will still prove useful (and, at times, pivotal). 
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2.5.4 Constraint 4:  Non-negative price margin 
Price may not fall short of marginal cost, lest the producer incur a loss per unit sold. 
C4:   p  ?  c [2.17] 
2.5.5 Resulting solution space 
All together, constraints C1 to C4 constitute solution spaces as outlined in the following 
Graphics 2.II and 2.III, respectively: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graphics 2.II: Solution space constituted by logical constraints C1, C2, C3a, and C4 
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Graphics 2.III: Solution space constituted by logical constraints C1, C2, C3b, and C4 
 
 
 
Again, it becomes clear that the solution space defined by constraint C3b is contained in the 
one defined by C3a. Thus, fulfilment of the stronger constraint C3b implies fulfilment of C3a. 
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3. PURE MONOPOLY 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 discusses the case where the monopolist agent is not threatened by entry of one or 
more potential entrants. 
 
 
 
3.1 Profit maximization 
 
 
The monopolist will attempt to maximize profit. The corresponding optimization is shown in 
[3.1]: 
? (?, p, q)  =   (N / L) · [? + 2 · (q – p)/? ] · (p – c) – k?· ?2 – kq· q2   ?  max! [3.1] 
The resulting solutions will be discussed in the following sections. 
 
The solution that will turn out to be optimal is presented in section 3.1.5 Marginal solution 
3b: Maximum range of attraction, but the other discussions may be of some interest, too, as 
they represent different extreme strategies: 
• Marginal solution 1: Maximum pricing 
• Marginal solution 2: Minimum horizontal expansion 
• Marginal solution 3a: Maximum horizontal expansion 
• Marginal solution 3b: Maximum range of attraction 
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• Marginal solution 4: Minimum pricing 
 
 
But before we look at those extreme (marginal) strategies, the first-hand inner equilibrium 
(non-marginal) solution must be examined: 
3.1.1 The non-marginal solution 
It can be shown
16
 that the analytical equilibrium (non-marginal) solution of problem [3.1] can 
be a maximum BUT it then necessarily violates the constraints of non-negativity of strategic 
variables. Therefore, it does not constitute a valid solution. 
 
This leaves us with the marginal solutions (MS1 to MS4) unfolding along the logical model 
constraints C1 to C4 (discussed in sections 2.5.1 to 2.5.4 and outlined in Graphics 2.II and 
2.III, respectively — see section 2.5.5 Resulting solution space), which will be discussed in 
the following sections 3.1.2 through 3.1.5. 
3.1.2 Marginal Solution 1:  Maximum price 
Maximum price or Quality pricing (border condition [3.2]) is the marginal case of the non-
negative consumer surplus constraint  (p  ?  q , cf. section 2.5.1): 
MS1:   p  =  pmax =  q [3.2] 
The maximum possible price is charged, and no consumer surplus left. Therefore, no 
consumer located outside the monopolist’s horizontal expansion ?, where he would have to 
incur actual transportation costs, has an incentive to buy, and will consequently not purchase. 
 
The resulting (modified) optimization equals 
                                                
16
 see Appendix A.1.3, p.59 
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? MS1(?, q = p)   =   (N / L)  ?  (q – c)  – k? · ?2  – kq · q2     max! [3.3] 
It can be shown
17
 that, depending on the parameter set, the critical point can indeed be a 
maximum, but it then necessarily violates the non-negativity constraints of strategic variables 
q* and p* = q*. Therefore, MS1 alone will not produce a valid solution. 
 
Corner solutions at C2, C3a/C3b, and C4 may still be optimal and will be discussed in 
sections 3.1.3, 3.1.4, and 3.1.5, respectively. 
3.1.3 Marginal Solution 2:  Minimum horizontal expansion 
Minimum or no horizontal expansion (border condition [3.4]) is the marginal case of non-
negative horizontal expansion  ?  ?  0  (cf. section 2.5.2): 
MS2:   ?  =  ?min =  0 [3.4] 
The resulting optimization equals 
? MS2(p, q)  =  (N / L)  2/? · (q ? p) (p ? c)  ? kq q2     max! [3.5] 
It can be shown
18
 that a maximum can exist but results in a negative value for quality, and in a 
price below marginal cost c, thus violating model constraints. If the critical point is not a 
maximum, the optimum may be found among the corner solutions, but again it can be shown 
that no corner solution produces a valid (non-zero) solution. 
                                                
17
 see Appendix A.1.4 
18
 see Appendix A.1.5 
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3.1.4 Marginal Solution 3a:  Maximum horizontal expansion 
Maximum horizontal expansion (border condition [3.6]) is the marginal case of the no excess 
horizontal expansion condition (cf. conditions [2.15] in section 2.5.3): 
MS3a:   ?  =  ?max  =  L [3.6] 
The modified optimization resulting from [3.6] equals 
? MS3a(p, q)   =   N · (p – c)  – kq q2  – k? L2   ?  max! [3.7] 
It becomes immediately clear that, for a profit-maximizing monopolist, it makes no sense to 
offer a quality exceeding price, as there are no consumers left outside our horizontal 
expansion ?max to attract by offering a positive consumer surplus (q  –  p). As a consequence, 
MS3a converges towards Constraint 1 (p  ?  q) until  p* =  q*, further reducing the problem 
to 
? MS3a(p)  =  N (p – c) – kq p2  – k? L2   ?  max! [3.8] 
the critical point of which necessarily is a profit maximum located at 
p*  =  q*  =  N / 2kq [3.9] 
But as a comparison with Marginal solution 3b (outlined in the following section 3.1.5) will 
show that MS3b is, in general, superior to MS3a, we will move on to it. 
 
 
The other corner solution at Constraint 4 (p  ?  c) or, consequently, (p = c), can by contrast 
not be optimal, as, with no margin (p – c), it is naturally impossible to generate positive profit. 
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3.1.5 Marginal Solution 3b:  Maximum range of attraction 
Where in 3.1.4, horizontal expansion goes to the very limits of the consumer spectrum L 
regardless of marginal profit (which actually becomes negative once the range of attraction r 
(see section 2.4.6) has reached the limits of L), a marginal solution along the lines of 
constraint C3b (no excess range of attraction, see [2.16] in section 2.5.3) might prove more 
useful for optimizing profit: 
MS3b:   r  =  ?  +  2/? · (q – p)  =!  rmax =  L    ? 
    ?*max  =  L  –  2/? · (q – p) [3.10] 
Thus, ?*max may be seen as the maximum rational horizontal expansion, as further expansion 
will neither increase the numbers of consumers nor profit, but only cause added expansion 
costs. 
?MS3b(p, q)  =  N · (p – c)  – kq q?  – k? · [L – 2/? · (q – p)]?   max! [3.11] 
The superiority of [3.11] over [3.7] becomes clear by comparing the expansion cost term, 
whose value is systematically lower by 2/? · (q – p) than the corresponding cost term in [3.7]. 
Therefore, MS3b is, in general, superior to MS3a. 
 
It can be shown
19
 that the resulting optimum is indeed always an inner equilibrium profit 
maximum at 
                                                
19
 as can be seen in Appendix A.1.7, with any strictly positive parameter configuration 
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q*  =  N / 2kq [3.12] 
p*  =  (N / 2kq  +  N / 8k?  –  L/2) [3.13] 
?*max  =  N  / 4k? [3.14] 
It is still possible for p* and q* to violate Constraint 1 (p  ?  q, non-negative consumer 
surplus, see section 2.5.1).
20
 In that special case, the constraint simply comes into effect, and 
the MS3b solution converges to the corner solution (MS1+3) of 
p*  =  q*  =  N / 2kq [3.15] 
With no consumer surplus (q* – p*), maximum attraction range (MS3b) equals maximum 
horizontal expansion (MS3a): 
?*  =  ?max =  L [3.16] 
 
 
In view of progressive costs to cover increasing market shares (quadratic cost terms for both 
quality and expansion), the optimality of full market coverage may come as a surprise. It can 
be shown though, that even lacking the advantageous possibility to attract via expansion (e.g. 
due to infinitely high expansion costs:  k?  =  ?), full market coverage is still optimal! 
For a detailed  deduction, see Excursus: Optimality of full market coverage without the 
possibility to expand in Appendix A.1.7 on p. 75. 
                                                
20
 this is true if N/L > 4k?/ 
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3.1.6 Marginal Solution 4:  Minimum price 
Minimum or Marginal cost pricing (border condition [3.17]) is the marginal case of the non-
negative price margin condition (p  ?  c, cf. condition [2.17] in section 2.5.4): 
MS4:   p  =  pmin  =  c [3.17] 
With no margin and hence no income, the profit function collapses at MS4 to a mere costs 
function: 
?MS4(?, q)   =  – k? · ??  –  kq · q? [3.18] 
It is immediately clear that the only solution to [3.18] must be the zero option (?*  =  0, 
q*  =  0). Therefore, all marginal solutions combining with MS4 to a corner solution are  
non-valid, too. 
 38 
3.2 Conclusions 
 
 
From ruling out the inner solution as well as the marginal solutions MS1, MS2, and MS4 in 
general, and by showing that MS3b is, in general, superior to MS3a,
21
 we can conclude that 
Marginal Solution 3b, maximizing range of attraction, constitutes the optimal strategy for 
a monopolist not under threat of entry optimizing profit. [3.19] summarizes optimal non-zero 
strategy, 
q*  +  N ?/ 8k?  –  L/2 
 q* 
q*  =  N / 2kq 
 
?*  =  N  / 4k? [3.19] 
 
[3.20] the complete strategic set (complete as it effectively covers all possible situations / 
parameter configurations, including the zero option if profit is negative): 
 N / 2kq if   ?* ? 0 
 0 if   ?* < 0 
 
 min
N /2kq + N 2 /8k? ? L /2
q*
 
 
 
 
 
	 
 if   ?* ? 0 
 0 if   ?* < 0 
 N  / 4k? if   ?* ? 0 
 0 if   ?* < 0 [3.20] 
 
                                                
21
 unless MS3b equals MS3a, when p rises to the level of q (see section 2.5.1) 
q* = 
p*  = 
?* = 
p*  =  min 
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It is therefore not optimal for a monopolist to restrain activities (range of attraction) to some 
limited part of the market but to spread over the entirety of the market, in general not by 
horizontal expansion alone, but by employing a mixed strategy offering some horizontal 
expansion ?* (dependent on expansion cost) as well as a positive maximum consumer surplus 
q* –  p* (dependent on quality production cost) attracting consumers (in fact, all consumers) 
located outside horizontal expansion. 
 
In equilibrium, the degree of horizontal expansion ?* depends only on expansion costs (k?) 
and, on the consumer side, transportation costs (?) and the number of consumers (N). 
 
Likewise, quality depends only on quality costs ( 2kq) and consumers (N). 
 
Price adjusts for the rest (i.e., characteristic space L). 
 
As stated in 3.1.4, the optimality of full market coverage may come as a surprise in view of 
progressive costs to cover market shares (quadratic cost terms for both quality and 
expansion). It can be shown though, that even lacking the advantageous possibility to attract 
via expansion (e.g. due to infinitely high expansion costs:  k?  =  ?), full market coverage is 
still optimal! 
For a detailed  deduction, see Excursus: Optimality of full market coverage without the 
possibility to expand in Appendix A.1.7 on p. 75. 
 
In terms of the exemplary interpretations discussed earlier, we could conclude that the mixed 
strategy (expansion plus quality) would include product designs that are just high-grade 
enough and just differentiated enough (e.g. in colour variants, or user interfaces suiting, up to 
a certain degree, both lovers of simplicity and high-end users who favour customizing every 
aspect) to be agreeable for all consumers, whatever their preferences may be. Real-world 
observations confirming this result can be found in abundance. 
 
 
 
The following chapter 4 will examine Entry Deterrence strategies given Threat of Entry. 
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4. ENTRY DETERRENCE 
 
 
 
 
The present chapter will discuss an incumbent’s possible strategies of entry deterrence meant 
to repel a potential entrant. As threat of entry is given, the incumbent must anticipate entry in 
every conceivable way (Central entry and competition, Central entry and peripheral 
competition, and Peripheral entry and competition). 
 
What will not be discussed in this context are alternative strategies on the part of the 
incumbent, like accommodating the entrant (e.g. by choosing a sideways location that would 
allow the entrant to profitably settle at some distance), which might well prove more 
profitable for the incumbent.
22
 
 
Chapter 4.1 will give some general considerations in terms of entry deterrence, whereas 
chapter 4.2 will deal with the different strategies of entry on the part of the entrant and 
preemptive deterrence strategies in more detail. 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Entry deterrence strategy in general 
4.1.1 Central location 
As the model assumes one single location per enterprise, and the potential entrant can be 
anticipated to move to the larger side of the market continuum (characteristic space L), it is 
rational for an incumbent wanting to deter the entrant to take a central position at L/2, thus 
                                                
22
 see e.g. HOTELLING (1929) 
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equally covering both halves of L, and minimizing the larger “free” part of the market 
continuum. 
Please note that this does, in general, not follow if the incumbent considers accommodating 
the entrant (which may well prove to be more profitable and may therefore, in a complete 
strategic set, be the strategy of choice). 
4.1.2 Choice of strategic variables 
The incumbent (henceforth indexed 1) will choose his strategic variables of horizontal 
expansion (?1), quality (q1), and price (p1) in a way that will reduce any potential entrant’s 
profits to zero, be he entering/competing in the centre of characteristic space or in its 
periphery. 
 
Should it be possible to prevent all conceivable entry and competition strategies (central and 
peripheral, respectively) simultaneously, then preemption (entry deterrence) is possible. 
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4.2 Strategies of Entry versus Entry Deterrence 
 
 
Generally, the entrant can be anticipated to employ (one of) three different strategies of entry. 
They will be discussed in the following sections 4.2.1 through 4.2.3. 
4.2.1 Central entry and competition 
The first strategy of entry the incumbent (indexed 1) must anticipate the entrant (henceforth 
indexed 2) to potentially employ, and therefore must prevent if he wants to deter him, is what 
will be called Central entry and competition, during the course of which the entrant would 
settle at the very same location in the middle characteristic space as the incumbent, in order 
to simultaneously compete on both sides of their shared central location. The entrant will try 
to offer a higher surplus to consumers in order to take them over, which is in turn anticipated 
by the incumbent. 
Please note that, unlike in the classical HOTELLING model, the incumbent and/or entrant will 
attract consumers on both sides, as, with horizontal expansion and vertical quality integrated 
into the model, there is no point in ruling out identical location: expansion and quality are 
meant to potentially attract consumers from beyond the competitor’s location. 
 
Having taken the same central location, competition will either take place in the very centre of 
characteristic space L, or in the periphery; the latter case will be discussed in section 4.2.2 
Central entry and peripheral competition. 
 
From the assumption of competition focussing on and the entrant locating himself in the very 
centre, and given that consumers purchase one unit maximum from the one producer that 
offers them the greater individual benefit, a situation analogue to classical BERTRAND 
competition
23
 results: One producer attracts all consumers, though not necessarily the one 
producer offering the lowest price as in the classical exogenous-quality model, but, as quality 
                                                
23
 BERTRAND, Joseph Louis François (1883): “Théorie des Richesses: revue de Théories mathématiques de la 
richesse sociale par Léon WALRAS et Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie des richesses 
par Augustin COURNOT”, Journal des Savants 67, pp. 499-508 
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has become variable and endogenous, the one offering the highest level of maximum 
consumer surplus (q – p) (see section 2.3.2), in this case: in the central location. Now as any 
potential entrant could emulate the incumbent’s strategy except for offering an incrementally 
higher level of maximum consumer surplus (q – p), the incumbent is forced to ever increase 
his own offered level of consumer surplus (q1 – p1) for as long as his profits are non-negative, 
leaving him, in the end, with the highest possible level of maximum consumer surplus 
(q1* – p1*) that can be produced without incurring a loss (no profit condition [4.1]); only then 
(loss-free) entry is foreclosed. 
?1*  =  0 [4.1] 
First of all, it becomes clear that if the highest possible level of maximum consumer surplus 
(q1* – p1*) alone is sufficient
24
 to cover the entire market L, it is optimal to adopt a strategy 
of offering zero horizontal expansion (analogously to Marginal Solution 2 in section 3.1.3), 
as any strictly positive horizontal expansion ?* > 0 would only cause costs, but would not lead 
to the attraction of more consumers — there simply aren’t any who do not already purchase. 
Graphics 4.I illustrates the situation: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graphics 4.I: Offered (q1* – p1*) sufficient to cover the entire market 
 
 
                                                
24
 This is the case if  L  ?  (N/2kq – 2c)/?  — that is, if consumer spectrum length L and/or transportation costs 
(factor ?) are sufficiently small. Note that, as a consequence, these two parameters are no longer factors in q*, 
or p*! 
?1* = 0 
q1* – p1* 
slope = ? 
L/2 L/2 N/L 
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For this case, it can be shown that the optimal (non-zero)
25
 strategy is: 
?1*  =  0 
p1*  =  c + N / 4kq 
q1*  = N / 2kq [4.2] 
Here one might notice that the well-known limitation for p* at q* (non-negative maximum 
consumer surplus constraint, see section 2.5.1) do not show — it is, in this case, not 
necessary, as, if p* grows near q*,
26
 consumer surplus will no longer be sufficient to cover the 
entire market, and the scenario discussed next becomes relevant: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graphics 4.II: Offered (q1 – p1) not sufficient to cover the entire market 
 
 
If (q* – p*) is not sufficient
27
 to cover the entire market L (as illustrated in Graphics 4.II 
above), it can be shown that another strategy is optimal: In order to maximize (q – p), it can 
be shown
28
 that it is optimal to offer a positive horizontal expansion that exactly covers the 
entire market (?1* =  ?L  > 0); thus, income from sales to all consumers can be invested into 
production of higher quality q1 ; this is analogue to Marginal Solution 3b in section 3.1.5. The 
situation is illustrated in Graphics 4.III: 
                                                
25
 given that the parameter configuration allows for non-negative profit — in this case of quasi BERTRAND 
competition, zero profit. If parameter configuration does result in strictly negative profit, well, then the zero 
option is of course preferable. 
26
 This happens when 4c kq grows close to N. 
27
 This is the case if  L  ?  (N/2kq – 2c)/?  — that is, if consumer spectrum length L and/or transportation costs 
(factor ?) are sufficiently small. Note that, as a consequence, these two parameters are no longer factors in q*, 
or p*! 
28
 see Appendix A.2.1, p.83 
(q1 – p1)/? 
?1 = 0 
q1 – p1 
slope = ? 
(q1 – p1)/? N/L 
L 
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Graphics 4.III: Positive horizontal expansion to cover the market (?1* =  ?L  > 0) 
 
 
 
The (non-zero) strategic set is stated in [4.3]: 
q1*  = N / 2kq 
p1*  =  p1*(q1*) 
p1*  = 
1
/8 k?kq {N? + 4 k?N – 4 k?kqL – ?[ kqN? (kqN?? + 4k? (N – 2kq (2c + L)))]} 
?1*  =  ?1*(p1*, q1*) 
?1*  =  L – 2/ (q1* – p1*) [4.3] 
It follows from the very approach that in both cases ( (q – p) sufficient to cover the market; 
horizontal expansion optimized in order to just cover the market), it is impossible for any 
potential entrant to offer a higher (q – p) at the central location than an incumbent having 
renounced to the totality of his profits in order to maximize central consumer surplus himself. 
 
Nota: (Total) pre-emption is only possible if the following alternative strategies of entry can 
be averted simultaneously (that is, in addition to preventing Central entry and competition). If 
a strategy preventing all approaches simultaneously does not exist, then neither does a NASH 
equilibrium, and systematic pre-emption is impossible. 
 
(q1* – p1*)/? 
q1* – p1* 
slope = ? 
(q1* – p1*)/? N/L 
L 
?1* = ?L 
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4.2.2 Central entry and peripheral competition 
The second possibility for the entrant to enter the market is to take the very same central 
location as the incumbent (in order to equally reach customers located both on the right and 
left halves of spectrum L), but, instead of trying to outcompete the incumbent by offering a 
higher consumer surplus at the centre (which is impossible without incurring a loss, as the 
incumbent already has maximized central consumer surplus, incurring total loss of his 
profits), the entrant circumvents the incumbent’s rigorous offer by offering a significantly 
lower (q – p), but by carrying this consumer surplus sideways into the periphery by expanding 
horizontally, thus “slipping under” the incumbent’s offer (see Graphics 4.IV). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graphics 4.IV: Efficiently reaching the marginal customer in terms of horizontal 
expansion ?2 
 
 
It is plausible and true that certain parameter configurations actually do allow for profitable 
Central entry and peripheral competition. Under those circumstances, a whole new 
competitive situation arises as the incumbent must anticipate profitable entry, and adapt his 
preemptive strategy accordingly: 
 
efficient 
(horizontally) 
inefficient 
xE 2 ?mc =  2/? · (q1 – p1 – q2 + p2) 
?1* = 0 
q1*– p1* 
slope = ? 
q2 – p2 
?2 
xE 2 ?mc  = ?1* + 2/? · (q1* – p1* – q2 + p2) 
?1* 
q1*– p1* 
slope = ? 
q2 – p2 
?2 
xE 2 ?mc =  2/? · (q1 – p1 – q2 + p2) (q2 – p2)/? (q2 – p2)/? 
?1* = 0 
q1*– p1* 
slope = ? 
q2 – p2 
?2* 
xE (q2 – p2)/? 2 ?mc  = ?1* + 2/? · (q1* – p1* – q2 + p2) (q2 – p2)/? 
?1* 
q1*– p1* 
slope = ? 
q2 – p2 
?2* 
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The incumbent must, again, optimize his offer until profit is reduced to zero, as he must rule 
out strategic emulation (infinitesimal undercutting) by the entrant (BERTRAND competition). 
But now optimization no longer aims at central consumer surplus but at peripheral consumer 
surplus instead, as illustrated in Graphics 4.V: 
 
 
 
 
 
Graphics 4.V: Maximizing peripheral consumer surplus u0 in case of full market 
coverage (FMC) 
 
 
 
The stable strategic set maximizing u0 in case of full market coverage (FMC) is derived in 
Appendix A.2.2
29
 and stated in [4.4]: 
q1*  = N / 2kq 
?1*  =  N ? / 4k? 
p1*  =  c + N / 4kq + N ?? / 16k? [4.4] 
In case of incomplete market coverage (as illustrated in Graphics 4.VI), 
                                                
29
 see Appendix A.2.2 p.85 
xE 
slope = ? 
(q1*– p1*)/? 
u0 
q1*– p1* 
(q1*– p1*)/? 
u0 max 
?1* 
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Graphics 4.VI: Maximizing peripheral consumer surplus u0 in case of incomplete 
market coverage (IMC) 
 
it can be shown
30
 that an analytical solution for IMC exists, too, but that it 
• overreacts to incomplete market coverage (IMC) conditions by increasing 
maximum consumer surplus (q – p) even further (instead of reducing it, 
according to the lower income generated when not covering the whole 
market), thereby 
• re-establishing full market coverage (thereby violating its own analytical 
assumptions), at the cost of 
• generating increasingly huge losses, and 
• taking place within the very same parameter space
31
 as the FMC solution 
where it is 
• systematically dominated by the FMC solution as the latter optimizes 
according to the correct (FMC) assumptions. 
 
 
Therefore (as the IMC solution systematically creates FMC conditions, thereby violating its 
own assumptions), the FMC solution (optimizing on the correct assumption to begin with) is 
dominant. 
                                                
30
 see Appendix A.2.2, pp. 91-93 
31
 the same valid parameter space, that is: It can be shown that there actually is a parameter space where the IMC 
solution manifests itself in actual IMC space (outside of FMC space) – but there it produces (invalid) negative 
values for ?*, p*, and q*. 
slope = ? 
(q1*– p1*)/? 
u0 
q1*– p1* 
(q1*– p1*)/? u0 max < 0 ?1* 
– u0 
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It can furthermore be shown that an analytical best response to the strategic FMC set [4.4] 
exists,
 32
 but that no parameter configuration exists that would allow for non-negative profits; 
therefore, we conclude that FMC strategy [4.4] is indeed preemptive. 
 
 
4.2.3 Peripheral entry and competition 
Peripheral entry and competition will be discussed as a counter-strategy to both Central entry 
and competition, and Central entry and peripheral competition. 
 
Either way, the potential entrant settles left or, equivalently, right of the incumbent’s central 
location in order to avoid the pre-emptively high level of offered consumer surplus in the 
centre (see the above section 4.2.1 Central entry and competition). Transport costs arising 
between the chosen peripheral and the incumbent’s central location shield the entrant’s offer 
from the fierce competition formed by the incumbent’s central offer, as transport costs 
systematically discount this maximized level of (q – p) to a significantly lower level of net 
consumer surplus in peripheral locations that might still allow for entry and competition. 
 
As the entrant’s problem boils down to reaching the marginal customer (located at ?mc) by 
offering an incrementally higher net surplus (these points of indifference are indicated as 
green dots in the following Graphics 4.VII) at his location, and, as a consequence, serving all 
(N · (L/2 – ?mc)) customers located beyond the marginal customer’s location, it becomes clear 
that it is always 
• inefficient to offer a higher maximum consumer surplus than needed to 
target the marginal consumer (“vertically inefficient”), and, consequently, 
inefficient to locate so far out that the targeted marginal consumer would no 
longer be located within the entrant’s horizontal expansion ?2 but between 
the incumbent’s and the entrant’s expansion.  
                                                
32
 see Appendix A.2.2 
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• inefficient to actually produce a positive horizontal expansion (“horizontally 
inefficient”), or, conversely, efficient to opt for no horizontal expansion at 
all (?2* = 0); 
these points are rational regardless of the incumbent offering horizontal expansion to cover 
the market (?1* = ?L > 0) or not (?1* = 0), and regardless of where the entrant’s actual (or, 
optimized) location (without loss of generality, at ?2 from the centre) might be: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graphics 4.VII: Efficiently reaching the marginal customer: no horizontal expansion 
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It can be shown
33
 that because of the fact that the entrant would need to provide for a 
competitive quality q2 (or, more precisely, a competitive net consumer surplus 
(q2  –  p2  –  ? · | zi ? zi*| )34 without being able to spread his quality production costs (kq · q22) 
over both halves of the consumer spectrum (generating income on both halves of L), it is 
impossible for the entrant to reach the marginal customer (via (q2* –  p2*)) without 
incurring a loss, even if he tries to do so efficiently (?2* =  0), and, naturally, whilst 
maximizing profits. 
 
We can conclude that with global quality costs, it is vital to serve customers on both sides, as 
could be seen in 4.2.2 Central entry and peripheral competition. 
 
                                                
33
 see Appendix A.2.3 
34
 see section 2.4.4 Net consumer surplus 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
 
Graphics 5.I and 5.II illustrate the analytical logic leading to the main conclusions from 
chapters 3 and 4, respectively, which are summarized in the following sections 5.1 through 
5.5 : 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graphics 5.I: No threat of entry model solution scheme 
 
 
 
3.,  A.1   No threat of entry__ 
_____(monopolist) 
A.1.3   Equilibrium solution 
outside valid solution space 
?   Marginal solutions 1-4 
A.1.4   Marginal solution 1 
(max. price  =  min. quality) 
?   Marginal solution 1+3 
A.1.8   Marginal solution 4 
(min. price) 
__?   0 optimal 
A.1.5   Marginal solution 2 
(no horizontal differentiation) 
?   Ms2+1,  Ms2+4 
A.1.7   Marginal solution 3b 
(FMC by mixed strategy) 
?   DOMINANT EQUILIBRIUM 
SOLUTION 
(validity constrained by Ms1) 
A.1.6   Marginal solution 3a 
(FMC by max. horizontal differentiation) 
?   Ms1+3 
A.1.5   Marginal solution 2+4 
?   0 optimal  
A.1.4   Marginal solution 2+1 
?   0 optimal_ 
A.1.X   Marginal solution 1+3 
?   FMC equilibrium solution__ 
but dominated by Ms3b 
whenever Ms3b is valid 
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Graphics 5.II: Threat of entry model solution scheme 
 
 
 
5.1 Full market coverage (FMC) as a result from global quality costs 
With global quality costs (e.g., highly variable research & development costs dominating 
quasi-invariant unit production costs), it is always optimal to cover the entire market — and 
never optimal to renounce to income in terms of purchases. Even the customers with the most 
exotic preferences (located at the extremes of the consumer spectrum) are served. 
 
The operating-systems market may serve as an example: Global development costs are 
substantially higher than unit production costs; one product is (horizontally) differentiated to 
variants until they are suited for any application; (vertical) quality is maximized in order to 
prevent competition from establishing themselves at any location market. 
4.,  A.2   Threat of entry____ 
__(incumbent) 
4.1.1,  A.2.1   Deterrence___ 
involves the central location 
4.2.3,  A.2.3   Peripheral 
entry and competition 
?   prevented by_._ 
Central entry and competition 
?   prevented by_._ 
Central entry and peripheral 
competition 
4.2.1,  A.2.1   Central entry and 
competition 
?   prevents_._ 
Peripheral entry and competition 
__?   but is outcompeted by__._ 
Central entry and peripheral 
competition 
4.2.2, A.2.2   Central entry and 
peripheral competition 
?   prevents_ 
Central entry and competition 
?   prevents_ 
Peripheral entry and competition 
?   PREEMPTIVE_ 
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5.2 Mixed strategy 
Optimal strategies are always mixed strategies, be they conceived to maximize a non-
threatened monopolist’s profits, or to take preemptive effect as the optimal strategy of an 
incumbent under threat of entry: All optimal strategies employ both horizontal 
differentiation/variation of the basic product, and a surplus vertical quality (a positive 
maximum surplus / non-negative net surplus for all consumers, even) in order to attract the 
entire consumer spectrum. 
 
As stated in 3.2, we could conclude that the optimality of above mixed strategy would favour 
product designs that are just high-grade enough and just differentiated enough (e.g. in colour 
variants, or user interfaces suiting, up to a certain degree, both lovers of simplicity and high-
end users who favour customizing every aspect) to be agreeable for all consumers, whatever 
their preferences may be. Real-world observations confirming this result are abundant. 
5.3 Central location 
Optimal monopolist and entry-deterring strategies are symmetrical, employing a central 
location. 
 
Please note that asymmetrical strategies can neither be ruled out for accommodating 
strategies, nor (theoretically) for entrants (were it not for the preemptive effect of the 
incumbent’s entry deterrence). 
5.4 Monopolist behaviour 
If threat of entry is not imminent, a monopolist will maximize his profits by exactly covering 
the entire market, starting from a central location, with a mixed strategy including both 
horizontal differentiation and vertical quality (a positive maximum consumer surplus, even). 
 
The complete strategic set has been laid out in [3.20]. 
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5.5 Entry deterrence under threat of entry 
If a potential entrant exists, he can indeed be deterred by competition analogue to classical 
BERTRAND competition, which forces the incumbent to preemptively annihilate his profits, 
else the entrant emulate (or infinitesimally undercut) his offer and replace him. As in 
BERTRAND competition, undercutting continues (or is anticipated, rather) until an agent finally 
annihilates the entire profit. 
 
Furthermore, it could be shown that the functioning deterrence strategy (maximizing 
peripheral consumer surplus up to the complete annihilation of profits) does not only prevent 
BERTRAND emulation, but also takes preemptive effect in view of attempts to enter the 
market employing an altogether different strategy, be it a symmetrical one deployed from the 
same central location (Central entry and peripheral competition), or an asymmetrical one 
where the entrant would take a peripheral location (Peripheral entry and competition). 
5.6 Prospect 
Future research could strive to develop a complete strategic set for the incumbent, including 
strategies other than entry deterrence, like accomodating the entrant, or tacit collusion. A 
comparison of all available strategies would entail the identification of a generally optimal 
strategy. 
 
Analogue to SALOP (1979), the number of firms entering a market, given above strategic 
behaviour, might be determined. 
 
The different strategies, i.e. the one to be chosen in oligopolistic competition, may be 
compared with respect to welfare, including an analysis of the chosen vs. the socially optimal 
strategic variables (location, expansion, quality, and price) as well as the resulting number of 
firms. 
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A. APPENDIX 
 
 
 
Appendices A.1 and A.2 will show the calculations for monopoly and entry deterrence, 
respecticely, on which statements in chapters 3. Pure Monopoly and 4. Entry Deterrence are 
based 
 
 
 
A.1 Closed-form solution for the monopoly situation 
A.1.1 The profit function 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graphics A.I: Interaction of the elements of the profit function ? (?, p, q) 
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The profit function is given by 
 
? (?, p, q)  =  N/L  (? + 2/? (q – p))⋅(p – c)  – kq⋅q  – k?⋅?   max ! 
 
subject to 
 
Constraint C1: p ? q  ?  0 
Constraint C2: – ?  ?  0 
Constraint C3: ?  +  2 (q – p)/?  ?  L 
Constraint C4: – p + c  ?  0 
Constraint C5: – q  ?  0 
A.1.2 The critical point 
First, the unconstrained inner optimum is determined, in order to see if it is a maximum, and 
if it lies within the boundaries drawn by constraints C1-5.  
It can be shown that an inner maximum with positive profit  ?*(p*, q*, ?*)  exists but 
necessarily violates the non-negativity conditions for ?* and q* (C2 and C5) as well as the 
marginal costs constraint C4 (p* ? c) : 
 
First order conditions are: 
 
??/?p  =   N/L  [ ?  +  2/?  (q – 2 p + c) ]  =  0 
??/?q  =  – 2 kq  q  +  2 p N/L?  –  2 c N/L?  =  0 
??/??  =   N/L (p – c) – 2 k?  ?  =  0 
 
 
Using Cramer’s Rule 
 
xi  =  det Hi / det H    for i 
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to solve the equivalent 3 x 3 linear equations system, 
   – 4 N/L?   p 2 N/L?  q N/L   p  – 2 cN/L? 
      2 N/L?   p – 2 kq   q 0     q =   2 cN/L? 
 + N/L    p 0    q – 2 k        cN/L 
 
 
 – 4 N/L? 2 N/L? N/L 
det H   =   2 N/L? – 2 kq 0 =   – 16 kq k N/L?  +  2 kq N?/L?  +  8 k N?/L??? 
 N/L 0 – 2 k 
 
 
 – 2 cN/L? 2 N/L? N/L 
det Hp  =   2 cN/L? – 2 kq 0 =   – 8 c k kq N/L?  +  2 c kq N?/L?  +  8 c k N?/L??? 
 cN/L 0 – 2 k 
 
 
 – 4 N/L? – 2 cN/L? N/L 
det Hq  =   2 N/L? 2 cN/L? 0 =   8 c k N?/L??? 
 N/L cN/L – 2 k 
 
 
 – 4 N/L? 2 N/L?  – 2 cN/L? 
det H?  =   2 N/L? – 2 kq  2 cN/L?  =   4 c kq N?/L?? 
 N/L 0 cN/L 
 
 
we get an inner optimum at 
 
 
p* =  det Hp / det H  =  c  +  4 c kq k L ? /(kq N ??  +  4 k N  –  8 kq k L ?) 
q* =  det Hq / det H  =  + 4 c k N /(kq N ??  +  4 k N  –  8 kq k L ?) 
* =  det H / det H  =  + 2 c kq N ? /(kq N ??  +  4 k N  –  8 kq k L ?) 
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A.1.3 Invalidity of the critical point 
Seeing that the resulting profit equals,  
 
 
?*(p*, q*, *)  =  – 4 c? kq k N /(kq N ?? + 4 k N – 8 kq k L ?) 
 
 
we can already conclude that it is impossible for ?* to be positive if constraints C2, C4, and 
C5 ( * ? 0 ,  p* ?  c , and  q* ? 0 , respectively), as the same denominator  (kq N ?? + 4 k N – 
8 kq k L ?)  is contained in the terms for  p*,  q*, and  *, on the one hand, and  ?* on the 
other hand, while the numerators’ algebraic signs are obviously not the same. 
Clearly, as inactivity would yield a better result (? = 0) than profit at the critical point 
(?* = 0), the critical point cannot be a maximum. In order to determine it, we will have to 
systematically compare results at the constraints. 
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To determine if a maximum exists, we use Sylvester’s Criterion: 
If the Hessian’s principal minors (the successive determinants det Hi,i < 0)  exhibit alternating 
algebraic signs (starting with a negative  det H1,1 < 0), then the function is negative definite, 
indeed producing a maximum: 
 
 
 – 2 k 0 N/L 
H(, q, p)   = 0 –2 kq 2 N/L? 
 N/L 2 N/L? – 4 N/L? 
 
 
det H1,1 =  – 2 k  <  0 
det H2,2 =  (–2 k) (–2 kq)  =  4 k kq  > 0 
det H3,3 =  (2 N/L???) · (kq N ?? + 4 k N – 8 kq k L ?) 
det H3,3  < 0    ?    (kq N ?? + 4 k N – 8 kq k L ?)  < 0    ?    * < 0,   p* < c,   q* < 0,   ?* > 0 
 
A maximum only exists outside the boundaries drawn by constraints C2, C4, and C5 for p*, 
q*, and *; therefore, the solution to the problem (a valid maximum) must be found along one 
or more of the binding constraints C1-5. 
 
 
Therefore, we can conclude that 
• a maximum exists if  (kq N ??  +  4 k N  –  8 kq kL ?)  is negative, 
• with positive profit equal to the constant term, 
• but the corresponding critical point (the strategic set analytically 
maximizing profit) is then located outside valid solution space (p* < c,  
q* < 0,  * < 0). 
• Having ruled out the inner solution, the optimal solution must necessarily 
coincide with one of the marginal solutions located at at least one of the 
variables’ constraints (at the very boundaries of valid solution space): 
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Graphics A.II: Solution space constituted by constraints C1, C2, C3a, and C4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graphics A.III: Solution space constituted by constraints C1, C2, C3b, and C4 
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A.1.4 Marginal solution 1:  Maximum price (p  =  q) 
Constraint 1 states that price may not exceed quality, else consumer surplus be negative. The 
corresponding marginal solution is, therefore, a (maximum) price set equal to quality:  p  =  q. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graphics A.IV: Marginal solution 1: Maximum price (p  =  q) 
 
 
 
The original profit function 
 
 
? (?, p, q)  =  N/L  (? + 2/? (q – p))⋅(p – c)  – kq⋅q?  – k?⋅??   max ! 
 
 
is thereby reduced to 
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? (?, q)  =  N/L  (?)⋅(q – c)  – kq⋅q?  – k?⋅??   max ! 
 
 
First order conditions are 
 
??/??  =   N/L (q – c) – 2 k?  ?  =  0 
??/?q  =   ? N/L – 2 kq q  =  0 
 
 
Using Cramer’s Rule to solve the 2 x 2 linear equations system, 
 
 
 – 2 k? N/L ? c N/L 
 N/L – 2 kq q 0 
 
 
 – 2 k? N/L 
 N/L – 2 kq  
 
 c N/L N/L 
 0 – 2 kq  
 
 – 2 k? c N/L 
 N/L 0  
we get an inner optimum at 
 
?* =  det H / det H  =  – 2 c kq L N /(4 k? kq L? – N?) 
q* =  p* =  det Hq / det H  =  – 2 c N? /(4 k? kq L? – N?) 
 
=
=   4 k? kq  –  N?/L? det H   = 
=   – 2 c kq N/L det H = 
=   – 2 c N?/L? det Hq  = 
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with a critical profit of 
 
?*(p* = q*, ?*)  =  + 4 c? kq N? /(4 kq k? L? – N?) 
 
 
Again, we can already see that it is impossible for ?* and p* = q*, ?* to be positive at the 
same time. If the Hessian’s principal minors (det H1,1 =  – 2 k? ,  det H2,2 =  4 kq k? L? – N? ) have 
alternating signs, then critical profit is positive and a maximum, but p* = q*  as well as ?* are 
negative. 
 
 
 
Therefore, we can conclude that 
• a maximum exists if  (4 kq k? L? – N?)  is positive, 
• with positive profit, 
• but the corresponding critical point is located outside valid solution space 
(p* = q* < 0,  ?* < 0). 
• Therefore, a valid solution at Constraint 1 must, if it exists, necessarily be a 
corner solution and coincide with more constraints than the one presently 
discussed. 
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The three marginal solutions limiting the solution space of Marginal solution 1 (see 
Graphics A.II) are 
 
• MS 1+2:  Max. price (p  =  q) + min. horizontal expansion (?  =  0) 
 It is easy to see that with neither consumer surplus (q – p = 0) nor horizontal 
expansion (? = 0), no consumers purchase, and the profit function collapses 
to a mere costs function 
 ?(q)  =  – kq⋅q?  ? max ! 
 whose optimal solution is, obviously, the zero option (q*  =  0). 
 
 
• MS 1+4:  Minimum = maximum price (p  =  q  =  c) 
 With no profit margin (p – c), the profit function again collapses to a mere 
costs function 
 ?(?)  =  – kq⋅c?  – k?⋅??  ? max ! 
 and the zero option (?*  =  0) becomes optimal. 
 
 
• MS 1+3:  Max. price (p  =  q) + max. horizontal expansion (?  =  L) 
 Covering the whole market by one’s offered horizontal expansion reduces 
the profit function to a convex quadratic function in q : 
 ?(q)  =  N⋅(q – c)  – kq⋅q?  – k?⋅L?  ? max ! 
 that allows for a simple F.O.C. 
 66 
??(q)/?q  =  – 2 kq q + N  =  0 
resulting in the critical point of 
q*  =  N / 2kq 
which necessarily is a maximum as the S.O.C. 
???(q)/?q?  =  – 2 kq q  <  0 
shows, where profits can be positive (naturally, that depends on the 
parameter set): 
?(q*)  =  N?/4kq  – c N  – k? L? 
Note: This valid solution (marginal solution at both Constraint 1 
(p  =  q) and Constraint 3 (?  =  L) needs to be compared to all other 
possibly optimal solutions before a statement on optimality can be made! 
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A.1.5 Marginal solution 2:  Minimum horizontal expansion (?  =  0) 
Constraint 2 states that horizontal expansion must be non-negative (?  ?  0); the corresponding 
marginal solution hence involves zero horizontal expansion (?  =  0). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graphics A.V: Marginal solution 2: Minimum horizontal expansion (?  =  0) 
 
 
 
The original profit function 
 
? (?, p, q)  =  N/L  [? + 2/ (q – p)]⋅(p – c)  – kq⋅q?  – k?⋅??   max ! 
 
is, accordingly, reduced to 
 
? (p, q)  =  N/L  [2/ (q – p)]⋅(p – c)  – kq⋅q?   max ! 
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First order conditions are 
 
??/?p  =  N/L  (2/)  (q – 2p + c)  =  0    ?    – 4 N/L  p  +  2 N/L  q  =  – 2 cN/L 
??/?q  =  N/L  (2/)⋅(p – c)  – 2 kq q  =  0    ?    2 N/L⋅p  – 2 kq q  =  2 cN/L 
 
 
Using Cramer’s Rule to solve the 2x2 linear equations system, 
 
 – 4 N/L 2 N/L p – 2 cN/L 
 2 N/L – 2 kq q 2 cN/L 
 
 
 –4 N/L 2 N/L 
    2 N/L –2 kq  
 
 –2 cN/L 2 N/L 
   2 cN/L –2 kq  
 
 –4 N/L –2 cN/L 
   2 N/L   2 cN/L  
we get an inner optimum at 
 
p* =  det Hp / det H   =   c (N – kq L ) / (N – 2 kq L )   =   c  +  (c kq L ) / (N – 2 kq L ) 
q* =  p* =  det Hq / det H   =   c  N            / (N – 2 kq L ) 
 
 
It can be seen that if  (N – 2 kq L ) > 0 , then  q* > 0,  p* > 0,  q* > p*,  and  p* > c. 
 
 
=
=   8  kqN/L  –  4 N?/L?? det H   = 
=   4 c kq N/L  –  4 cN?/L?? det Hp = 
=   – 8 cN?/L??  +  4 cN?/L?? det Hq  = 
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Critical profit equals 
 
?*(p*, q*)  =   – c? kq N / (N – 2 kq L ?) 
 
 
det H1,1 =  – 4N/L?  < 0 
det H2,2 =  8 kqN/L? – 4 N?/L???  > 0    ?    (N – 2 kq L ?)  <  0 
 
 
Again, we see that it is impossible for  ?*  and  p*  and  q*  to be positive at the same time. 
If (N – 2 kq L ?) < 0, then the Hessian’s principal minors (det H1,1 and det H2,2) have 
alternating signs, critical profit is positive and a maximum, but then  q*  is negative and  
p* < c. 
 
 
Therefore, we conclude that 
• a maximum exists if  (N – 2 kq L ?)  is negative, 
• with positive profit equal to the constant term, 
• but the corresponding critical point (the strategic set analytically 
maximizing profit) is then located outside valid solution space (q* <  0, 
p* <  c). 
• Therefore, a valid solution at Constraint 2 must, if it exists, necessarily be a 
corner solution and coincide with more constraints than the one at hand. 
 
The two marginal solutions limiting Marginal solution 2 (see Graphics A.II) are: 
 
• MS 2+1:  Min. horizontal expansion (?  =  0) + max. price (p  =  q) 
 Discussed in above section A.1.4. No incentive to purchase, therefore no 
purchases, and no income. The optimal strategy is the zero option 
(p*  =  q*  =  0). 
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• MS 2+4: Min. horizontal expansion (?  =  0) + min. price (p  =  c) 
 Without a positive profit margin (p  –  c), the profit function collapses to a 
mere costs function 
 ? (q)  =  – kq⋅q?  ? max ! 
 and the zero option (q*  =  0) becomes optimal once again. 
We can therefore conclusively rule out a valid solution at Constraint 2. 
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A.1.6 Marginal solution 3a:  Maximum horizontal expansion (?  =  L)  
Constraint 3a states that it is not rational for horizontal expansion to exceed the consumer 
spectrum:  ?  ?  L . Please note that, other than Constraint 3b, the logic of this constraint 
remains unchanged even under threat of entry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graphics A.VI: Marginal solution 3a:  Maximum horizontal expansion (?  =  L) 
 
 
 
With maximum horizontal expansion, the profit function is reduced to 
 
? (p, q)  =  N⋅(p – c)  – kq⋅q?  – k?⋅L?   max ! 
 
Furthermore, as there is no market left to attract outside the boundaries of ?max, it makes no 
sense to produce a higher quality q than necessary to generate price p. Thus, MS 3a 
necessarily converges towards MS 1 (p  ?  q) until  p  =  q . This case 
 
? (p)  =  N⋅(p – c)  – kq⋅p?  – k?⋅L?   max ! 
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has been discussed in chapter A.1.4, i.e. in section MS 1+3 […],
35
 leading us to a profit 
maximum at 
 
p*  =  q*  =  N / 2kq 
 
Please note again: This solution needs to be compared to all other valid solutions (esp. 
Marginal solution 3b, see below) in order to be able to pronounce a generally valid statement 
on strategic optimality. 
 
 
 
A.1.7 Marginal solution 3b:  Full market coverage 
Rationally, a monopolist not threatened by potential entry will not finance a horizontal 
expansion that, in combination with the attraction effect of maximum consumer 
surplus (q  –  p), would lead to an attraction range exceeding full market coverage (the 
consumer spectrum L). 
 
Please note that, other than Constraint 3a, the logic of this constraint becomes void under 
threat of entry, as it may well be favourable to push one’s horizontal expansion out beyond 
the point of full market coverage in order to outcompete a potential entrant and/or prevent his 
entry and competition in the extremal regions of the consumer spectrum. 
 
Thus, Constraint 3b can be formulated as 
 
?*  ?  L  –  2/ ⋅ (q – p) 
                                                
35
 in the perfectly equivalent form of  ?(q)  =  N⋅(q – c)  – kq⋅q?  – k?⋅L?   max ! 
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Graphics A.VII: Marginal solution 3b:  Max. market coverage (?  =  L – 2/?⋅(q – p) ) 
 
 
 
The original profit function 
 
? (?, p, q)  =  N/L  (? + 2/? (q – p))⋅(p – c)  – kq⋅q?  – k?⋅??   max ! 
 
is,  in Marginal solution 3b  (?  =  L – 2/? ⋅ (q – p) ),  reduced to 
 
MS 3b: ? (p, q)  =  N⋅(p – c)  – kq⋅q?  – k?⋅[ L – 2/? (q – p) ]?   max ! 
 
of which we can already see (by comparison) that it is systematically superior to Marginal 
solution 3a 
 
MS 3a: ? (p, q)  =  N⋅(p – c)  – kq⋅q?  – k?⋅L?   max ! 
 
discussed above in A.1.6, as the quadratic expansion costs term in MS 3b is necessarily 
smaller. 
N/L 
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First order conditions are 
 
??/?p =  N  – 4 k?/  [ L – 2/  (q – p) ]  =  0    ?    – 8 k?/?   p   + 8 k?/?   q   =  – N  + 4 k? L/ 
??/?q = –2 kq q + 4 k?/  [ L – 2/  (q – p) ] = 0   ?   8 k?/?   p + (– 2 kq – 8 k?/?) q  =  – 4 k? L/ 
 
Using Cramer’s Rule to solve the 2 x 2 linear equations system, 
 
 –8 k?/? +8 k?/? p – N + 4 k? L/ 
 +8 k?/?  –2 kq –8 k?/? q – 4 k? L/ 
 
 
 –8 k?/? +8 k?/? 
 +8 k?/? –2 kq –8 k?/?  
 
 – N + 4 k? L/ +8 k?/? 
 – 4 k? L/ –2 kq –8 k?/?  
 
 –8 k?/? – N + 4 k? L/  
  +8 k?/?   – 4 k? L/  
we get an inner optimum at 
 
p*  =  det Hp / det H   =   N/2kq  +  N ?/8k?  –  L /2 
q*  =  det Hq / det H   =   N/2kq  > 0 
Critical profit equals 
 
?*(p*, q*)  =   N ⋅(N/4kq  + N ?/16k?  – L ?/2  – c) 
 
 
=
=   16 kq k?/? det H   = 
=   2 kq N – 8 k? kq L/ + 8 k? N/? det Hp = 
=   8 k? N/? det Hq  = 
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q* exceeds p* as long as  (N/L  <  4 k?/)  is true, else (in case Constraint 1 (p  ?  q) is not thus 
met) the solution converges towards Constraints 1+3
36
 (see section A.1.4). Please note that at 
Constraint 1 (p  =  q), there is no longer a difference between Constraint 3a and Constraint 3b 
(see Graphics A.II and A.III, respectively). 
The principal minors of  ? (x, z)  are 
 
det H1,1  =  – 8 k?/?  < 0 
det H2,2  =  16 kq k?/?  > 0 
 
Therefore, the critical point is necessarily a maximum. 
 
We conclude that 
 
• at C3b, a maximum necessarily exists, 
• with profit equal to the constant term, 
• at p*  =  N / 2kq  +  N ?? / 8k?  –  L ? / 2 
  q*  =  N / 2kq 
  ?*  =  N ? / 4k? 
 
• This solution may still violate the non-negative consumer surplus constraint 
p*  ?  q*  (it does if  N/L  >  4 k?/  is true); then but only then corner 
solution from Constraints 1+3 
p* = q* = N/2kq 
?*  =  L 
is optimal (see section A.1.4, MS 1+3). 
 
                                                
36
 The only other possible conversion being Constraint 4 (marginal cost pricing), where a valid solution can 
conclusively be ruled out, as shown in the following section A.1.8. 
 76 
• Either way, the market is fully covered. 
 
• If we include the zero option as the optimal strategy in case of otherwise 
negative profits, the complete strategic set is 
 
 N / 2kq if   ?* ? 0 
 0 if   ?* < 0 
 
 min
N /2kq + N 2 /8k? ? L /2
q*
 
 
 
 
 
	 
 if   ?* ? 0 
 0 if   ?* < 0 
 
 N ? / 4k if   ?* ? 0 
 0 if   ?* < 0 
 
As the next section will rule out Marginal solution 4 as a valid solution, this strategic set is 
conclusively shown to be the optimal strategy for a monopolist not under threat of entry. 
Excursus: Optimality of full market coverage without the possibility to 
expand 
 
In view of progressive costs to cover market shares (quadratic cost terms for both 
quality and expansion), the optimality of full market coverage may come as quite 
a surprise. It can be shown though, that even lacking the advantageous possibility 
to attract via expansion (e.g. due to infinitely high expansion costs:  k?  =  ?), full 
market coverage is still optimal: 
 
q* = 
?* = 
p*  = 
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? (?, p, q) =   N/L  [? + 2/?⋅(q – p)]⋅(p – c)  – kq⋅q?  – k?⋅??    max ! 
? (p, q) =   2N/L?⋅(q – p)⋅(p – c)  – kq⋅q?    max ! 
 
??/?p =  2N/L? ⋅(q – 2 p + c)  =  0 
??/?q =  2N/L? ⋅(p – c)  –  2 kq⋅q   =  0 
 
p*  =  c + c kq ? / (N/L – 2 kq ?)  > c     if    N/L > 2 kq ? 
q*  =  (c N/L) / (N/L – 2 kq ?)   > p*     if    N/L > 2 kq ? 
?*  =  – c2 kq N/L / (N/L – 2 kq ?)  > 0  if    N/L < 2 kq ? 
 
 – 4 N/L? 2 N/L? 
 2 N/L? – 2 kq  
 
det H1,1 =  – 4 N/L?   < 0 
det H2,2 =  8 kq N/L? – 4 N2/L2?2  > 0    if    N/L < 2 kq ? 
 
  no valid optimum as every profit maximum (N/L < 2 kq ?) occurs outside valid 
parameter space (N/L > 2 kq ?), i.e. where the constraints for  p*  and  q*  ( p* > c,   
q* > p* ) are met. 
Therefore, the valid solution has to be a marginal solution. Of the emerging three, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graphics A.VIII: Marginal solutions if expansion is impossible 
 
 
 
H   = 
p 
q 
p = c     and   c < q < c + L/2 
p = q   and   p > c 
p = q – Lt/2   and   p > c 
0 
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two can easily be ruled out: 
 
p  =  pmax  =  q   without consumer surplus nor expansion, no consumer buys 
p  = pmin  =  c   no profit 
leaving us, again, with the full market coverage solution: 
 
2/?  (q – p)  =  L       full market coverage 
     p  =  q – L?/2     ?     p* < q* 
 
? (q)  =  N⋅(q – L?/2 – c)  – kq⋅q2 
d? / dq  =  N – 2 kq⋅q  =  0               d2? / dq2  =  – 2 kq  < 0    maximum 
? q*  =  N / 2kq 
? p*  =  N / 2kq – L?/2 
 
Clearly, this conforms with the general (MS3b) solution of   q* = N / 2kq   and 
p* = N / 2kq – L?/2 + N?2/ 8k?   whose last term disappears if   k?  ? . 
 
 
 
Now as full market coverage has been shown to be optimal even without the 
possibility to attract via expansion, we can a forteriori conclude that given the 
possibility to horizontally expand (k?  <<  ?), full market coverage must be 
optimal all the more – as we add the possibility of expansion in order to more 
easily attain full market coverage, we incrementally increase ?*, which 
successively substitutes costly quality/consumer surplus while costing nothing: 
 
K?(? ? 0)  =  k? · ??  ? 0 
 
The above solution can only be shown to be the optimal solution if we can rule out the last 
remaining marginal solution (MS4) as well, which will quickly be accomplished in the 
following section: 
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A.1.8 Marginal solution 4:  Minimum price (p  =  c) 
Constraint 4 states that price may not undercut marginal costs (p  ?  c), else the profit margin 
and therefore profits be negative. The corresponding marginal solution is, therefore, a 
minimum price set equal to marginal costs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graphics A.IX: Marginal solution 4:  Minimum price (p  =  c) 
 
 
 
With  p = c , the original profit function 
 
?(?, p, q)  =  N/L  (? + 2/ (q – p))⋅(p – c)  – kq⋅q?  – k?⋅??   max ! 
 
instantly collapses to a mere cost function: 
 
?(?, q)  =  – kq⋅q?  – k?⋅??   max ! 
 
where the zero option (?* = 0,  q* = 0) becomes the obvious optimal choice. 
We can therefore conclusively rule out Marginal solution 4 as a valid solution. 
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A.2 Closed-form solution for Entry Deterrence 
 
 
 
A.2.1 Central entry and competition  calculation 
Assumption: Both the incumbent and the entrant would locate in the very centre of the 
consumer spectrum (at L/2) and compete by maximizing their respective (index i) central 
consumer surplus (qi  –  pi). 
 
uL/2(pi, qi)  =  qi – pi   ? max ! 
 
 
The incumbent settles in the centre for reasons of symmetry that might be quite intuitive: In 
case of threat of entry, the entrant is not “invited” to easily locate on either “free” side. 
Without threat of entry or in case of preemption, it is easiest to reach both ends of 
characteristic space and thus (potentially) cover the entire market (full market coverage, 
FMC). 
 
 
Two cases need to be distinguished: 
• Optimal maximum consumer surplus (q1* –  p1*) alone is sufficient to cover the 
entire market L. This case is discussed below. 
• Optimal maximum consumer surplus (q1* –  p1*) is not sufficient to cover the entire 
market L. 
This case will be discussed after. 
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Graphics A.X: Optimal (q1* –  p1*) sufficient to cover the entire market 
 
 
 
Assuming the first case, it becomes clear that horizontal expansion ?  is a mere cost factor 
(see below), as it does not lead to additional peripherally located consumers (they are, by the 
assumption of market coverage, already purchasing, because quality and price (q1* –  p1*) do 
offer them a positive net surplus at every location of L). The according profit function 
 
?1(?1, p1, q1)  =  N  (p1 – c)  – kq· q1?  – k?· ?1? 
 
shows that, for ? , the zero option is optimal (?1*  =  0), leaving us with 
 
?1(p1, q1)  =  N  (p1 – c)  – kq· q1? 
 
 
Now, as any strategy the incumbent employs could be emulated (and infinitesimally undercut) 
by any potential entrant,
37
 the incumbent is forced to annihilate his profits (as in the classical 
BERTRAND model). This gives us a  p/q  relation that annihilates profits (p°/q°): 
 
?1(p1, q1)  =  N  (p1 – c)  – kq· q1?   =!  0 
   p1°(q1)  =  c + kq/N · q1?     or, equivalently,     q1°(p1)  =  ± ?[N/kq · (p1 – c)] 
 
Primordially, central consumer surplus  uL/2 needs to be maximized: 
 
                                                
37
 subject to identical cost factors  c, kq, k?  as the first mover, that is 
?1* = 0 
q1* – p1* 
slope = ? 
L/2 L/2 ? 
L 
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uL/2(p1, q1)  =  q1 – p1    max ! 
 
uL/2(p1°(q1), q1)  =  q1 – (c + kq/N · q1)    max ! 
 
F.O.C:  uL/2(p1°(q1), q1) / q1  =  /q1  [ q1 – (c + kq/N · q1) ]  =  1 – 2 kq/N · q1 =!  0     
  
q1*  =  N / 2kq 
p1*  =  p1°(q1*)  =  c + kq/N · q1*  =  c + N / 4kq 
?1*  =  0 
 
 
Please note that Constraint 1 (p1*  ?  q1*) is met if N  ?  4 c kq , which is generally true as we 
assumed that optimal consumer surplus (q1* –  p1*) was sufficient to cover the entire market 
L. 
?1* necessarily meets Constraint 2 (?  ?  0) and Constraint 3 (?  ?  L). 
p1* necessarily meets Constraint 4  (p  ?  c). 
 
 
S.O.C. show that this strategic configuration is indeed a maximum: 
 
 uL/2(p1) / p1 =  – N/4kq · [N/kq · (p1 – c)]–3/2   < 0    as    p1  >  c 
 uL/2(p1) / p1 q1 =     0 
 uL/2(q1) / q1 =  – 2 kq/N   < 0 
 
– N/4kq · [N/kq · (p1 – c)]–3/2    0 
   0 – 2 kq/N 
 
1(H)  =  – N/4kq · [N/kq · (p1 – c)]–3/2   < 0   as   p1 > c | ? p1* 
2(H)  =  + N/2 · [N/kq · (p1 – c)]–3/2   > 0   as   p1 > c | ? p1* 
Hessian  H  = 
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In the second case, optimal maximum consumer surplus (q1* –  p1*) is not sufficient to 
cover the market (as shown in Graphics 4.XI): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graphics A.XI: (q1* –  p1*) not sufficient to cover the market 
 
 
 
Analogously to the monopoly case discussed in A.1 (A.1.1 through A.1.7), the inner 
equilibrium and marginal solutions except for Marginal solution 3b: Full market coverage 
can be ruled out as valid or optimal solutions, leaving us, again, with full market coverage as 
the dominant strategy:
38
 It is consumer-surplus maximizing and therefore optimal to employ a 
positive horizontal expansion  ?1* >  0 that exactly covers the market (as shown below in 
Graphics A.XII): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graphics A.XII: Horizontal expansion employed to exactly cover the market (?1* >  0) 
 
 
 
Either way, Central entry and competition is not a-priori preemptive, as an entrant may still 
outcompete the incumbent by carrying a lower (non-maximized) level of consumer surplus 
(q2 –  p2) farther into the periphery (by employing a   ?2   higher than   ?1*), thus offering a 
                                                
38
 optimal if profitable that is, else the zero option be optimal 
(q1 – p1)/? 
?1 = 0 
q1 – p1 
slope = ? 
(q1 – p1)/? N/L 
L 
(q1* – p1*)/? 
q1* – p1* 
slope = ? 
(q1* – p1*)/? N/L 
L 
?1* = ?L 
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(marginally) higher level of net surplus to the consumers located there (reddishly shaded 
locations in Graphics A.XIII and A.XIV, respectively): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graphics A.XIII: Outcompeting the incumbent peripherally (?1* =  0) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graphics A.XIV: Outcompeting the incumbent peripherally (?1* >  0) 
 
 
 
The optimal variant of this strategy will be discussed in the following section (A.2.2 Central 
entry and peripheral competition). 
 
A.2.2 Central entry and peripheral competition  calculation 
 
Again, two cases need to be distinguished: 
• Optimal maximum consumer surplus (q1* –  p1*) alone is sufficient to cover the 
entire market L. This case is discussed below. 
• Optimal maximum consumer surplus (q1* –  p1*) is not sufficient to cover the entire 
market L. This case will be discussed after. 
?1* = 0 
q1* – p1* 
slope = ? 
N/L 
q2 – p2 
?2 
slope = ? 
N/L 
q2 – p2 
q1* – p1* 
?1* > 0 
?2 
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Graphics A.XV: Maximizing peripheral consumer surplus u0 in case of full market 
coverage (FMC) 
 
 
 
The incumbent’s (indexed 1) maximization of peripheral net consumer surplus u0 
 
u0(?1, p1, q1)  =  q1 – p1 +  (?1/2 – L/2)   max! 
 
still needs to be profit-maximizing, given any level of attained u0 (otherwise the same level of 
u0 could be offered more efficiently / at lower costs). As we assume full market coverage 
(FMC), the incumbent’s profit function equals 
 
?1 FMC(?1, p1, q1)  =  N  (p1 – c)  – kq· q1?  – k?· ?1?   max! 
First, we normalize marginal utilities   ?u0 / ?x1   by the respective corresponding investment   
?? / ?x   to obtain marginal utility gain per profit unit invested: 
 
 
?u0 / ??1  =  /2  ??1 FMC / ??1  =  – 2 k?· ?1 
?u0 / ?p1  =  – 1  ??1 FMC / ?p1  =  N 
?u0 / ?q1  =  1   ??1 FMC / ?q1  =  – 2 kq· q1 
 
 
(?u0 / ??1)  /  (??1 FMC / ??1)  =  /2 / (– 2 k?· ?1) 
(?u0 / ?p1)  /  (??1 FMC / ?p1)  =  –1 / N 
(?u0 / ?q1)  /  (??1 FMC / ?q1)  =  1 / (– 2 kq· q1) 
xE 
slope = ? 
(q1*– p1*)/? 
u0 
q1*– p1* 
(q1*– p1*)/? 
u0 max 
?1* 
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Furthermore, normalized marginal utilities must be equal, else a mere shift in investment (a 
transfer of invested profit units from one cost centre to another, e.g. from quality to horizontal 
expansion or to a lower price) could still increase u0. 
 
 
F.O.C. 1+2: 
 (?u0 / ??1)  /  (??1 FMC / ??1)  =  (?u0 / ?p1)  /  (??1 FMC / ?p1)  =  (?u0 / ?q1)  /  (??1 FMC / ?q1) 
/2 / (– 2 k?· ?1*)   =   –1 / N   =   1 / (– 2 kq· q1*) 
 
 
From this, we already get 
 
q1*  =  N / 2kq 
 
?1*  =  N ? / 4k? 
 
 
Optimal price p1* we get from F.O.C. 3 (BERTRAND: no profit left, else the incumbent’s 
strategy be emulated and incrementally undercut): 
 
F.O.C. 3: 
 
?1(?1*, p1*, q1*)  =  N  (p1* – c)  – kq· q1*?  – k?· ?1*?   =  0 
 
  p1*  =  c  +  N / 4kq  +  N ?? / 16k? 
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Thus, the stable strategic set efficiently maximizing u0 and renouncing to profits, on  
condition of full market coverage (FMC), is: 
 
 min
c + N /4 kq+ N? 2/16 k?
q*
 
 
 
 
 
 
if   ?* ? 0 
 0 if   ?* < 0 
 N / 2kq if   ?* ? 0 
 0 if   ?* < 0 
 
 N ? / 4k? if   ?* ? 0 
 0 if   ?* < 0 
 
 
From a central location, this deterrence strategy (?1*, p1*, q1*) cannot be outcompeted 
peripherally. 
 
In order to prove that it is preemptive, we first need to show that, in addition, it is impossible 
for any centrally locating entrant (indexed 2) to outcompete it centrally, too, which could be 
achieved by offering a higher benefit near the centre by offering a higher maximum consumer 
surplus (q2 – p2) but not investing in carrying it out into the periphery via an increased ?2 . 
Second, we’ll need to show that no peripherally located entrant can profitably outcompete the 
incumbent in the periphery; this case will be discussed in section A.2.3 Peripheral entry and 
competition. 
The above deterrence strategy is actually preemptive if it prevents either kind of entry. 
?* = 
p*  = 
q* = 
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Graphics A.XVI: Centrally outcompeting the incumbent’s peripherally optimized 
deterrence strategy 
 
 
 
The length of the central segment of the market that, hypothetically
39
, could be captured by an 
entrant, equals 
 
?2 + 2/? · (q2 – p2 – q1* + p1*) 
 
 
 
Resulting profit would equal 
 
 
?2(?2, p2, q2)  = N/L [ ?2 + 2/? · (q2 – p2 – q1* + p1*) ] · (p2 – c) – kq· q2? – k?· ?2?   max! 
 
?2(?2, p2, q2)  = N/L [ ?2 + 2/? (q2 – p2 – N /2kq + c + N / 4kq + N ?? / 16k?) ] · (p2 – c) 
– kq· q2? – k?· ?2?   max! 
 
 
                                                
39
 if profitable 
uL max = u0 max 
q1*– p1* 
slope = ? 
(q1 – p1)/? 
u0 max 
(q1 – p1)/? 
q2 – p2 
?2 ?*1 
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But even maximizing profit ?2 by employing the following optimal response strategy, 
 
 
F.O.C.: 
 
? ?2(?2, p2, q2) / ??2  =  N/L · (p2 – c) – 2 k?· ?2  =!  0 
 
? ?2(?2, p2, q2) / ?p2  =  N/L · ?2 + N/L · (2/) · (q2 – 2 p2 – N / 4kq + 2 c + N ? / 16k?)  =!  0 
 
? ?2(?2, p2, q2) / ?q2  =  N/L · (2/) · (p2 – c) – 2 kq· q2  =!  0 
 
 
 
?2*  = (– kq N? ? + 4 k? N? ) / (8 k?) / (kq N ? + 4 k? N – 8 kq k? L )  
 
p2*  = (– kq N ? · (4 c – L ) + 4 k? N · (L  + 4 c) – 32 c kq k? L ) / 4 / (kq N ? + 4 k? N 
– 8 kq k? L ) 
 
q2*  = (– kq N? ? + 4 k? N?) / (4 kq) / (kq N ? + 4 k? N – 8 kq k? L )  
 
 
 
?2*(?2*, p2*, q2*)  =  N · (p2* – c) – kq· q2*? – k?· ?2*? 
 
 
 
for which a valid solution space 
 
?2* >  0 
and 
?2* <  L 
and 
p2* >  0 
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and 
q2* >  0 
and 
q2* – p2*  >  0 
does exist at 
 
 
N  ?  4 k? L /  
and 
kq >  (4 k? N?  – 32 k?? L N) / (N?  + 8 k? L N ? – 64 k?? L? ) 
and 
c  >  (kq? L N  – kq N? ? – 4 kq k? L N  + 4 k? N?) / (4 kq? N ? – 32 kq? k? L  + 16 kq k? N) 
 
or 
 
4 k? L /   <  N  ?  8 k? L  
and 
kq <  4 k? / ? 
and 
c  >  (kq? N L  – kq N? ? – 4 kq k? L N  + 4 k? N?) / (4 kq? N ? – 32 kq? k? L  + 16 kq k? N) 
 
or 
 
N  >  8 k? L  
and 
4 k? / ?  >  kq >  (4 k? N?  – 32 k?? L N) / (N?  + 8 k? L N ? – 64 k?? L? ) 
and 
c  <  (kq? L N  – kq N? ? – 4 kq k? L N  + 4 k? N?) / (4 kq? N ? – 32 kq? k? L  + 16 kq k? N) 
 
 
 
solving the inequality system shows that no valid parameter configuration 
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c >  0 
kq >  0 
k? >  0 
L >  0 
N >  0 
? >  0 
 
exists that would allow for non-negative profits ?2  ?  0, given the incumbent’s deterrence 
strategy (?1*,  p1*,  q1*, see above). Therefore, Central entry and peripheral competition 
prevents this variant of Central entry and competition, even if it has been optimized. 
 
What remains to be shown in order for a claim of complete preemption, is that Central entry 
and peripheral competition cannot be outcompeted by Peripheral entry and competition, 
which will be shown in section A.2.3. 
 
The alternative case of incomplete market coverage (IMC) is illustrated in Graphics 
A.XVII: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graphics A.XVII: Maximizing peripheral consumer surplus u0 in case of incomplete 
market coverage (IMC) 
 
 
Calculation proceeds analogously to the FMC case. The incumbent (indexed 1 as usual) 
maximizes his offered peripheral net consumer surplus u0 
slope = ? 
(q1*– p1*)/? 
u0 
q1*– p1* 
(q1*– p1*)/? u0 max < 0 ?1* 
– u0 
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u0(?1, p1, q1)  =  q1 – p1 +  (?1/2 – L/2)   max! 
 
Any level of u0 needs to be attained while profit-maximizing (otherwise the same level of u0 
could be offered more efficiently / at lower costs). As we now assume incomplete market 
coverage, the profit function remains unchanged: 
 
?1(?1, p1, q1)  =  N/L · [ ?1 + 2/ · (q1 – p1) ] · (p1 – c)  – kq· q1?  – k?· ?1?   max! 
 
 
We normalize marginal utilities  ?u0 / ?x  by the respective corresponding investment   
??1 / ?x   to obtain marginal utility gain per profit unit invested: 
 
 
?u0 / ??1  =  /2 ??1 / ??1  =  N/L · (p – c) – 2 k?· ?1 
?u0 / ?p1  =  – 1 ??1 / ?p1  =  N/L · [ ?1 + 2/ · (q1 – 2p1 + c) ] 
?u0 / ?q1  =  1  ??1 / ?q1  =  N/L · (2/) · (p – c) – 2 kq· q1 
 
 
(?u0 / ??1)  /  (??1 / ??1)   =   /2 / [ N/L · (p – c) – 2 k?· ?1 ] 
(?u0 / ?p1)  /  (??1 / ?p1)   =   –1 / { N/L · [ ?1 + 2/ · (q1 – 2p1 + c) ] } 
(?u0 / ?q1)  /  (??1 / ?q1)   =   1 / [ N/L · (2/) · (p – c) – 2 kq· q1] 
 
 
Again, normalized marginal utilities must be equal, else a mere shift in investment (a transfer 
of invested profit units from one cost centre to another, e.g. from quality to horizontal 
expansion or to a lower price) could still increase u0. 
 
F.O.C. 1+2: (?u0 / ??1)  /  (??1 / ??1)  =  (?u0 / ?p1)  /  (??1 / ?p1)  =  (?u0 / ?q1)  /  (??1 / ?q1) 
 
 /2 / [ N/L · (p – c) – 2 k?· ?1 ]   =   –1 / { N/L · [ ?1 + 2/ · (q1 – 2p1 + c) ] } 
=   1 / [ N/L · (2/) · (p – c) – 2 kq· q1] 
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F.O.C. 3 results from BERTRAND competition: 
 
?1(?1, p1, q1)  =  N/L · [ ?1 + 2/? · (q1 – p1) ] · (p1 – c)  – kq· q1?  – k?· ?1?   =!  0 
 
 
 
Solving for  ?1, p1, q1  yields 
 
 
?1* =  0 
p1* =  0 
q1* =  0 
 
or 
 
?1*  =  4 c kq N ? / (kq N ?? + 4 k? N – 8 kq k? L ?) 
p1*  =  2 c ⋅[ 1 + 4 kq k? L ? / (kq N ?? + 4 k? N – 8 kq k? L ?) ] 
q1*  =  8 c k? N / (kq N ?? + 4 k? N – 8 kq k? L ?) 
 
 
The latter strategy should be optimal if the resulting profits are zero but not negative,
40
 BUT it 
shows that the solution for incomplete market coverage (IMC) systematically 
overcompensates incomplete market coverage by increasing investments even more, as, 
analytically, the assumption of IMC falsely promises even greater profits as customers from 
beyond the actual dimension of the market (L) would be attracted. This leads to over-
investments in attraction range, although no increased income from beyond the boundaries of 
L counterbalances those increased investments (no additional customers can actually be 
attracted). Thus, the IMC solution results in (more than) full market coverage (FMC), and 
the FMC solution is dominant, as it optimizes on the right assumption (of FMC) to begin 
with. 
 
                                                
40
 else the former (the zero option) would of course be preferable 
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In order to prove this conclusion, valid parameter spaces must be examined systematically: 
 
Question 1: Does a valid parameter space exist that is not covered by the FMC solution and 
where the IMC solution does not cover (or over-cover) the entire market? 
 
no FMC if attraction range  <  length of characteristic space 
no FMC if ?1 FMC + 2/ · (q1 FMC – p1 FMC)  <  L 
 
IMC if ?1 IMC + 2/ · (q1 IMC – p1 IMC)  <  L 
 
Is there a valid (non-negative) parameter space where no-FMC and IMC are true 
at the same time? 
 
– Yes, No-FMC and IMC are true at the same time if 
 
kq N ? + 4 k? N – 8 kq k? L    <  0 
 
BUT this inevitably leads to invalid results: 
 
?1 IMC*  <  0 
q1 IMC*  <  0 
 
 
Question 2: Does a valid parameter space exist where FMC is true but IMC isn’t? 
 
FMC if attraction range  ?  length of characteristic space 
FMC if ?1 FMC + 2/ · (q1 FMC – p1 FMC)  ?  L 
 
no IMC if ?1 IMC + 2/ · (q1 IMC – p1 IMC)  ?  L 
 
Is there a valid (non-negative) parameter space where FMC and no-IMC are 
true? 
 
– No. 
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From this we can conclude the following (EULER) set diagram (Graphics A.XVIII): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graphics A.XVIII: Parameter and solution spaces of FMC and IMC 
 
 
 
So there is a valid parameter space where FMC is false and IMC is true, but the resulting 
solution is then necessarily outside valid solution space as the strategic variables  ?1 IMC*  and  
q1 IMC*  are necessarily negative. 
 
Conclusion: 
As any solution results in full market coverage, the optimal FMC strategy dominates the 
IMC solution, and we can rule out the IMC solution altogether. 
FMC valid 
parameter space 
positive solution 
IMC valid 
parameter space 
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A.2.3 Peripheral entry and competition  calculation 
In section A.2.2 we have shown that an agent settling in a central position (at L/2) and 
employing a full market coverage strategy maximizing peripheral consumer surplus by 
choosing
41
 
 
 c  +  N / 4kq  +  N ?? / 16k? 
  q* 
 
q1*  =  N / 2kq 
 
?1*  =  N ? / 4k? 
 
 
cannot be outcompeted if he/she choses to annihilate profits, but can him-/herself profitably 
outcompete any agent settling centrally not annihilating profits, be he maximizing central or 
peripheral consumer surplus (u0 or uL/2 , respectively). 
 
 
We will show that Peripheral entry and competition does not embody a viable
42
 strategy to 
oppose any of the central strategies discussed before (Central entry and competition in 
section A.2.1, or Central entry and peripheral competition in section A.2.2, thereby finally 
proving the strategic set of the latter (above  p1*, q1*, ?1*) to be preemptive with respect to 
all other strategies
43
). 
                                                
41
 provided that profits are non-negative, otherwise the zero option is of course preferable 
42
 i.e., producing non-negative profits 
43
 as it has been shown in section A.2.2 that Central entry and peripheral competition outcompetes Central entry 
and competition 
p1*  =  min 
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Graphics A.XIX: The entrant trying to outcompete the incumbent’s Central entry and 
competition by locating peripherally 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graphics A.XX: The entrant trying to outcompete the incumbent’s Central entry and 
peripheral competition by locating peripherally 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graphics A.XXI: Rationalizing  ?2  (?2*  =  0) 
 
 
 
Comparing Graphics A.XIX, A.XX, and A.XXI, it becomes clear that investing in horizontal 
expansion does not contribute in any way to reaching any point of indifference (as usual, 
indicated as a green dot. Therefore, the optimal  ?2  is  ?2*  =  0. 
uL max = u0 max 
q1*– p1* 
slope =  – ? 
u0 
(q1* – p1*)/? 
q2 – p2 
?*1 
?2 
?*1 
uL/2 max 
q1 – p1 
slope =  – ? 
L/2 
q2 – p2 
?1 = 0 ?2* = 0 
?2* = 0 
uL max = u0 max q1*– p1* 
slope =  – ? 
u0 
(q1* – p1*)/? 
q2 – p2 
?*1 
?*1 
(q2 – p2)/? 
?2 
uL/2 max 
q1 – p1 
slope =  – ? 
q2 – p2 
?1 = 0 ?2 
L/2 
 98 
 
 
As a function of the entrant’s location ?2, his profit function will equal 
 
?2(p2, q2, ?2)  =  N/L · (?2) · (p2 – c) – kq· q2   max! 
 
In order to attain indifference at location ?2 (with respect to the incumbent’s chosen  ?1,  p1,  
q1), the entrant must offer a consumer surplus of at least
 44
 
 
(q2 – p2)  ?  (q1 – p1) –  · (L/2 – ?2 – ?1/2) 
 
 
Rationally, he will also not offer a higher maximum consumer surplus than that, so we can 
equalize 
 
(q2 – p2)  =  (q1 – p1) –  · (L/2 – ?2 – ?1/2) 
 
and substitute 
 
?2  =  L/2 – ?1/2 + 1/ · (q2 – p2 – q1 + p1) 
 
 
The profit function then equals 
 
?2(p2, q2, ?2)  =  N/L · (?2) · (p2 – c) – kq· q2   max! 
 
?2(p2, q2)  =  N/L · [L/2 – ?1/2 + 1/ · (q2 – p2 – q1 + p1) ] · (p2 – c) – kq· q2   max! 
 
 
 
                                                
44
 It’s easiest to measure ?2 from the nearest end of the consumer spectrum L, then the formula is correct in this 
form, regardless of the entrant’s location being left or right of the centre (?2 being smaller or larger than L/2). 
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From F.O.C. 
 
? ?2(p2, q2) /?p2  =  N/L · q2  – 2 N/L · p2  – N/L (q1 – p1) + (N/2 – N/2L · ?1) + cN/L =!  0 
 
? ?2(p2, q2) /?q2  =  N/L · p2  – cN/L  – 2kq· q2  =!  0 
 
 
we get the  critical point  at 
 
p2*  =  1/(N – 4 kq L ?) · [ c N + 2 kq L ? · (q1 + ?/2 · ?1 – p1 – L ?/2 – c) ] 
 
q2*  =  N/(N – 4 kq L ?) · (c – L ?/2 + q1 + ?/2 · ?1 – p1) 
 
and (see above) 
 
?2*  =  0 
 
 
S.O.C. 
 
? ?2(p2, q2) / ?p2 =  – 2 N/L < 0 
 
? ?2(p2, q2) / ?p2 q2 =     N/L? > 0 
 
? ?2(p2, q2) / ?q2 =  – 2 kq < 0 
 
 
or the corresponding Hessian 
 
– 2 N/L    N/L? 
   N/L? – 2 kq 
?1(H)  = – 2 N/L   < 0 
?2(H)  = 4 kq N/L – N/L   > 0   if    4 kq L  – N  >  0 
H(?2)  = 
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indicate the likelihood of a maximum. 
 
 
But even maximizing his profits (?2* =  ?2(?2*, p2*, q2*) ) by employing the optimal answer 
to the incumbent’s (?1*, p1*, q1*), solving the inequality system for non-negative profit shows 
that no valid parameter configuration 
 
c >  0 
kq >  0 
k? >  0 
L >  0 
N >  0 
 >  0 
 
exists that would result in a valid solution
45
 generating non-negative profits (?2  ?  0), given 
the incumbent’s strategy (?1 = ?1*,  p1 = p1*,  q1 = q1*); this is true for both the Central entry 
and competition optimum strategy, and the Central entry and peripheral competition 
optimum strategy. 
 
Therefore, as neither a peripherally nor a centrally settling entrant can generate non-negative 
profits, be he competing in the centre or peripherally, we can conclude that the 
INCUMBENT’s deterrence strategy (above ?1*,  p1*,  q1*) MAXIMIZING PERIPHERAL 
CONSUMER SURPLUS (the Central entry and peripheral competition optimum) indeed 
takes  PREEMPTIVE  effect (effectively deters entry). 
 
                                                
45
 0  ?  ?2*  ?  L  (or, in the present case of peripheral settling, L/2) 
c  ?  p2*  ?  q2* 
q2*  >  0 
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Abstract 
This paper will attempt to create a theoretical model integrating horizontal and vertical 
product differentiation as well as optimal price setting. 
 
 
Horizontal differentiation will occur in two different ways: First — analogously to the 
standard HOTELLING model — by choosing a location along a spectrum of individual 
customer preferences (product or characteristic space), and second, by choosing a length of 
horizontal expansion extending symmetrically from the chosen location in its centre, 
allowing the producer to design a product simultaneously and equally covering more than one 
individual preference at a time. 
 
 
Vertical differentiation will occur by choosing a level of produced quality equally perceived 
by all potential customers, regardless of the horizontal location of their individually preferred 
characteristic. Only one single level of quality is chosen, resulting in quasi-fixed cost 
independent of the number of units produced. 
 
 
Optimal price setting will occur by determining one single optimal price valid for every 
customer regardless of their horizontal location of their preferred characteristic (mill pricing).  
I.e., a firm may not differentiate prices, setting different prices for different market segments/ 
consumers. 
 
 
First, a monopolist’s optimal choice of the strategic variables location, horizontal expansion, 
quality, and price will be determined, assuming that there is no threat of entry. 
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Second, we will examine an incumbent’s possible entry deterrence strategies in oligopolistic 
competition with free entry. On the part of the entrant, three different strategies of entry 
will be discussed: Central entry and competition, Central entry and peripheral competition, 
and Peripheral entry and competition. These must in turn be anticipated by the incumbent, 
whose respective deterrence strategies will be compared with regard to their preemptive 
effect. 
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Abstract in German / Deutschsprachige Kurzbeschreibung des Inhalts 
Die vorliegende Arbeit entwickelt ein industrieökonomisches Modell, das horizontale und 
vertikale Produktdifferenzierung in sich vereint, und gleichzeitig auch den Preis als 
strategische Entscheidungsvariable behandelt. 
Zur horizontalen Produktdifferenzierung stehen zwei Möglichkeiten zur Verfügung: 
Zum einen – analog zum Modell von HOTELLING (1929) – durch die Wahl eines „Ortes” 
innerhalb eines Spektrums subjektiver Präferenzen der KonsumentInnen, zum anderen, 
symmetrisch von diesem Ort ausgehend, durch horizontale Expansion in diesen Markt 
(Präferenzen-Raum). Dies bildet die Möglichkeit ab, Produkte anzubieten, die mehr als nur 
eine einzige Präferenz abdecken, sondern eine ganze Spanne an Präferenzen gleichermaßen 
nutzenbringend bedienen. 
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Vertikale Produktdifferenzierung geschieht durch die strategische Wahl der Qualität. Im 
Gegensatz zu und unabhängig von obigen subjektiven Präferenzen, wird Qualität von allen 
potenziellen KonsumentInnen gleichermaßen wertgeschätzt. Der Produzent kann sich nur für 
ein einziges Qualitätsmaß entscheiden und dieses allen KonsumentInnen anbieten. Die Kosten 
der produzierten Qualität sind mengenunabhängig, also quasi-fix. 
Die Preisoptimierung erfolgt durch die Wahl eines einzigen Preises, zu dem das Produkt 
allen KonsumentInnen gleichermaßen angeboten wird (einheitlicher Fixpreis) – 
Preisdifferenzierung im Sinne unterschiedlicher Preise für verschiedene Käufersegmente ist 
also ausgeschlossen. 
 
Zunächst wird der klassische Monopol-Fall betrachtet; hier wählt der Monopolist seine 
strategischen Variablen ohne durch etwaigen Markteintritt anderer Produzenten bedroht zu 
sein. 
 
 
Danach wird die Möglichkeit des Markteintritts eines oder mehrerer Konkurrenten 
angenommen (also oligolistischer Wettbewerb bei freiem Markteintritt), und 
(ausschließlich) die entsprechenden Abwehrstrategien des etablierten Produzenten 
betrachtet. Konkurrenten können mittels dreier verschiedener Strategien auf den Markt 
drängen, die zentraler Markteintritt und zentraler Wettbewerb, zentraler Markteintritt und 
Wettbewerb in der Peripherie und Markteintritt und Wettbewerb in der Peripherie genannt 
werden. Diese drei Möglichkeiten müssen vom etablierten Produzenten antizipiert werden; 
seine entsprechenden Abwehrstrategien werden auf ihren abschreckenden Effekt hin 
untersucht. 
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